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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW
Crowell & Moring LLP*
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") provides the exclusive
basis for suing a foreign sovereign in United States courts.' While the
FSIA generally grants immunity to foreign sovereigns, it also lays out a
number of exceptions under which U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction.2
Thus, plaintiffs have used this statute as a basis to sue foreign governments
and their agencies and instrumentalities in a variety of contexts, ranging
from purely commercial disputes to wrongful death claims on behalf of
victims of state-sponsored terrorism. The purpose of this Review is to pro-
vide an overview of the primary areas of litigation under the FSIA through
an analysis of judicial decisions invoking the statute in 2014.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2014OVER the years, the jurisprudence surrounding the FSIA has
grown increasingly sophisticated, as parties raise more nuanced
and creative arguments. Although the FSIA is a relatively short
statute, the issues the statute raises are complex, and undeniably impor-
tant in light of the continuing globalization of business and increasing
involvement of sovereigns and their instrumentalities in international
commerce. Not surprisingly, FSIA litigation in 2014 continued to focus
on the statute's "commercial activity" exception,3 but also dealt with vari-
ous other issues. As the cases show, the core issues sovereign and private
litigants face under the FSIA include:
* Who is a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts?
* When has a foreign state waived its immunity?
* Which acts by a state are "commercial," and which are
"governmental"?
* How close must the nexus be between an act and the U.S.?
* When may plaintiffs pursue foreign sovereign assets located in the
U.S. to satisfy U.S. court judgments or qualifying arbitration awards?
* This Review was authored by Crowell & Moring attorneys Laurel Pyke Malson,
Aryeh S. Portnoy, Emily Alban, Shannon Barnard, Kate M. Growley, and Belinda
Liu.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
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This Review will focus on the answers to those questions provided by
U.S. courts in 2014. This Review also includes a short introduction to the
FSIA as well as some practical guidance based on recent FSIA decisions.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. From as early as 1812, in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon,4 U.S. courts generally declined to assert jurisdiction over
cases involving foreign government defendants, a practice rooted in a
sense of "grace and comity" between the U.S. and other nations.5 In-
stead, judges deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether
such cases should proceed in U.S. courts, and only exercised jurisdiction
where the U.S. State Department expressly referred claims for their
consideration. 6
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department is-
sued the so-called Tate Letter announcing its adoption of a new "restric-
tive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity.7 The Tate Letter directed
that foreign states continue to be granted immunity from suits involving
their sovereign, or "public," acts.8 But acts taken in a commercial, or
"private," capacity no longer would be protected from U.S. court review.9
Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to seek the Executive
Branch's view on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to assert ju-
risdiction over foreign sovereigns-a system that risked inconsistent out-
comes and was susceptible to "diplomatic pressures rather than to the
rule of law."10
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity and empower-
ing the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch." Today, the FSIA provides the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts. 12
The FSIA provides that "foreign states," including their "political sub-
divisions" and "agencies or instrumentalities,"13 shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, unless the state has waived its immunity or
one of the exceptions to immunity set forth in the statute applies.14 The
FSIA includes several provisions that define the scope of these excep-
4. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
5. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
6. See id. (explaining the history of the FSIA).
7. Id. at 486-87.
8. Id. at 487.
9. Id.
10. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
12. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
14. See id. § 1604.
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tions, and establishes detailed procedural requirements for bringing
claims against a foreign sovereign defendant.' 5
The primary exceptions to immunity are set forth in sections 1605 and
1605A of the FSIA.1 6 These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims
based on commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortious or
terrorist acts by foreign sovereign entities, or claims for which the sover-
eign has explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity.17 In instances where
a claim falls under one of the FSIA exceptions, the Act provides that the
foreign state shall be subject to jurisdiction "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual."' 8 The FSIA also includes sepa-
rate provisions establishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity) from
the attachment of foreign sovereign property located in the United
States, in aid of execution on a judgment against a foreign state or its
agencies or instrumentalities.1 9 Finally, the FSIA sets forth various
unique procedural rules for pursuing claims against foreign states includ-
ing: special rules for service of process, default judgments, and appeals.20
In 2014, courts considered almost all of these elements of the FSIA.
III. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES, AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES
A threshold issue in any case brought under the FSIA is whether the
defendant constitutes a "foreign state" under the statute. If the defen-
dant meets the definition of a foreign state, it will be immune from juris-
diction unless an exception applies. 21 If the defendant meets the
definition of a foreign state and an exception applies, proper service of
process under the FSIA may grant both subject matter and personal juris-
diction over the defendant, even where personal jurisdiction might not
otherwise exist. 2 2 A "foreign state" is defined to include not only the
state itself (i.e., the state writ-large or its political subdivisions), but also
its agencies and instrumentalities. 23
15. See id. §§ 1605, 1608, 1610-1611.
16. Id. §§ 1605, 1605A.
17. Id.
18. See id. § 1606; but see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (providing federal statutory cause of ac-
tion for terrorism-related acts).
19. See id. §§ 1610-1611 (For example, property belonging to a foreign central bank or
monetary authority and held for its own account is immune from suit absent a
waiver. §1611(b)(1). Likewise, military property held by a military authority and
used or intended to be used in connection with military activity is immune from
attachment. § 1611(b)(2)).
20. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(g), 1608.
21. See id. § 1604.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) ("Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to
every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject matter] jurisdic-
tion ... [and] where service has been made.); see also GSS Group Ltd. v. Nat'l Port
Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("In other words . . . subject matter
jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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A. AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES: DEFINING "ORGAN
OF A FOREIGN STATE"
The definition of "agency or instrumentality" is found in section
1603(b). To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state,
an entity must be (1) a "separate legal person," that is (2) either "an or-
gan of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof" or an entity "a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by [the]
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof;" and (3) "neither a citizen
of a State of the United States .. . nor created under the laws of any third
country." 24 The majority of cases interpreting this portion of the statute
focus on whether, under the second prong, an entity qualifies as an "or-
gan of a foreign state," which the statute does not define.25 Some courts
have found five factors to be relevant, with no single factor being
dispositive:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose;
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity;
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees
and pays their salaries;
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [for-
eign] country; and
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.2 6
Other courts have considered similar factors to evaluate "whether the
entity engages in a public activity on behalf of the foreign government" 27
including: "the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation, the pur-
pose of its activities, its independence from the government, the level of
government financial support, its employment policies, and its obligations
and privileges under state law." 28
In many cases, it is either obvious that an entity is an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state, or the parties do not dispute it. For example,
reported decisions in 2014 treated the following entities as agencies or
instrumentalities of a foreign state without discussion: a Kazakh sover-
24. Id. § 1603(b). The phrase "not created under the laws of any third country" re-
flects the requirement that the entity must have been created under the laws of the
country of which it purports to be an "agency or instrumentality." See Aluminum
Distribs., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C 6477, 1989 WL 64174,
*2 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1989) ("GARMCO is created under the laws of Bahrain, one
of the owner nations. Hence, it is not created under the laws of a third nation, and
it is a foreign state under § 1603.").
25. See id.
26. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Kelly v. Syria Shell
Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 846-47 (5th Cir. 2000)). These factors are
sometimes described as the "Filler factors." See In re Aluminum Warehousing An-
titrust Litigation, No. 13-md-2481 (KBF), 2014 WL 4211353 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2014) (slip op.).
27. NXP Semiconductors USA Inc. v. Brevets, C 14-1225 SI, 2014 WL 4621017, *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014).
28. See id. (quoting Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 807 (9th Cir. 2001),
aff'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 468 (2003)).
2016] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2014
eign wealth fund,29 a Mexican Consulate,30 the Nicaraguan social security
agency,31 the Hungarian national railway, 32 the Iraqi Ministry of Trade,33
a Saudi Arabian University, 34 the Venezuelan state oil company,35 the
Czech Republic's Ministry of Health,36 a Venezuelan Consulate, 37 the
London police,38 and a Filipino adoption agency.39
In some cases, however, courts considered the question more in depth,
analyzing whether certain defendants qualified as sovereign entities for
FSIA purposes.
1. Sovereign State's U.S. Counsel-Not an Organ of the State
In Mare Shipping v. Squire Sanders (US) LLP, the Second Circuit af-
firmed that a sovereign state's U.S. counsel was not a sovereign entity
under the FSIA.40 The claims stemmed from protracted litigation in both
the U.S. and Spain over a 2002 oil spill off the coast of Spain.41 In the
U.S. proceedings, U.S. counsel for Spain prepared various witness decla-
rations.42 After the U.S. action had been dismissed, the plaintiffs brought
an action seeking discovery for use in the Spanish litigation, alleging that
the witness declarations were false and seeking information from Spain's
U.S. counsel about the preparation of those declarations.43 The court
held that the plain text of the FSIA "excludes a foreign sovereign's U.S.
counsel" 44 from the definition of an agency or instrumentality. There-
fore, Spain's U.S. counsel was not immune from discovery.45
29. Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 2 F. Supp.
3d 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd in part,813 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016).
30. Blake Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate General, Civil Action No. 3:08-cv-1010
-0 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
31. Araya Solorzano v. Gov't of Republic of Nicaragua, 562 Fed. Appx. 901 (11th Cir.
2014).
32. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp. 3d 381 (D.D.C. 2014).
33. Reynolds Shipping USA LLC v. Ministry of Trade of Republic of Iraq, No. H-13-
mc-0068, 2014 WL 2800758 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2014).
34. Kettey v. Saudi Ministry of Education, 53 F. Supp. 3d 40 (D.D.C. 2014). The court
also treated the Saudi Ministry of Education and the Saudi Ministry of Higher
Education as state political subdivisions, which plaintiffs also did not contest.
35. Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd. v. Arevanca, S.A., No. 11-cv- 4296 (DLC), 2014 WL
3928704 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2014).
36. Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic Ministry of Health, 64 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C.
2014).
37. Fraser v. Rodriguez-Espinoza, No. 14 CV 1046, 2014 WL 4783095 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
24, 2014).
38. Ezeiruaku v. Bull, 2014 WL 5587404, Civil Action No. 14-2567 (JBS/KMW) (D. NJ
Nov. 3, 2014).
39. McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Bd. of the Republic of the Phil., 62 F.
Supp. 3d 187 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2014).
40. Mare Shipping v. Squire Sanders (US) LLP, 574 Fed. Appx. 6 (2d Cir. 2014).
41. Id. at 7
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. (notwithstanding the holding, the court declined to compel discovery, but or-
dered the defendant not to destroy any records, in case discovery was appropriate
later).
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2. French Patent Promotion Corporation-Not an Organ of the State
In NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. France Brevets S.A.S., the court
held that a corporation created by the French government to promote
and monetize patents was not an agency or instrumentality of France. 46
The court found that, although the corporation was funded by the French
government, and supervised by a Board of Directors appointed by the
government, it was established as a standard limited liability company,
with no special status and no regulatory authority. 47 Accordingly, the
court held that it is "more similar to a private company acting to maxi-
mize profits, as opposed to an arm of the state conducting sovereign
functions." 48
3. English For-Profit Investment Exchange-Organ of the State
The court in In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation held
that the London Metal Exchange is an 'organ' of the United Kingdom,
even though it is a for-profit company, privately owned by a Hong Kong
securities and futures exchange. 49 The London Metal Exchange provides
a platform for trading industrial metal contracts, and is a "recognized in-
vestment exchange" under U.K. law, meaning it has statutory obligations
regarding maintaining the prices of metals.50 The court held that, "while
not formed by the U.K. Government, the Exchange was charged by stat-
ute with performing the decidedly public function of market regula-
tion,"51 and noted that an agency of the U.K. government actively
supervises the Exchange, and that U.K. law treats the Exchange as a state
organ by partially immunizing certain regulatory functions from suit. 5 2
These factors outweighed the countervailing factors that Exchange em-
ployees were not public employees and their salaries were not paid by the
state, and that the Exchange did not have the exclusive right to act as a
"recognized investment exchange." 53
4. European Community-Organ of the State(s)
In European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., the Second Circuit held
that the European Community qualified as an organ of a foreign state
46. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. France Brevets, S.A.S., No. C 14-1225 SI, 2014
WL 4621017 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014).
47. Id. at *7.
48. Id. The court also concluded that the corporation was not an agency or instrumen-
tality by virtue of the ownership of its shares. The French government owned only
50% of the shares; the other 50% was owned by an instrumentality of the French
government, but the court nevertheless concluded that instrumentality was not a
political subdivision of France. Id. at *7-8.
49. In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, No. 13-md-2481 (KBF), 2014
WL 4211353 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2014) (slip op.).
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id. at *11.
52. Id. at *11-12 (discussing the first, second, and fifth Filler factors).
53. Id. (discussing the third and fourth Filler factors).
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under the FSIA. 5 4 The European Community, as plaintiff, argued that it
was a state organ not to establish immunity (because the European Com-
munity had waived immunity by initiating the proceedings), but so that
the federal court would have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.55 The court rejected the defendants' arguments that an organ of a
foreign state must be subordinate to a larger entity, and could not be an
international organization created by multiple states. 56 The court held
that the European Community was an organ of the various member
states because those member states (1) created the European Community
for a national purpose, "to establish governmental control on a collective
basis over various national functions;" 57 (2) actively supervise the Euro-
pean Community by appointing representatives to the Council of Minis-
ters and appointing commissioners to the European Commission;58 (3)
pay the salaries of European Community officials, who are considered
public employees; 59 (4) give the European Community the exclusive right
to authorize issuance of banknotes and conclude certain multilateral
agreements; 60 and (5) consider the European Community to be a govern-
mental entity, even if no European law clearly addresses the question.6 1
5. New York and UK Corporate Entities and Foundation-Organs of
the State
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, the district court held that the four defend-
ants were all agencies or instrumentalities of the state of Iran, even
though three were incorporated or otherwise established under New
York law and one was incorporated under the laws of the United King-
dom. 6 2 The defendants had been created at the direction of Iranian au-
thorities in order to own and manage certain property on behalf of the
Iranian government. 63 Judgment creditors of Iran, seeking to enforce ter-
rorism-related judgments obtained under the FSIA, sought turnover of a
54. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2014).
55. Id. at 143.
56. Id. at 144, 147.
57. Id. at 145.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 146.
61. Id. at 146-47. See also Guardian Industries Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 143 T.C. 1 (2014) (holding that European Commission is an instrumen-
tality of European Community member states, for the purposes of interpreting
provisions of the tax codes, but applying the same test courts use in FSIA
determinations).
62. In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, No. 08 Civ. 10934 (KBF), 2014 WL
1516328 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2014), rev'd sub nom. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave.
& Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2016). Specifically, the defendants
were a New York corporation; its parent, a corporation domiciled in the United
Kingdom; a foundation established as a New York non-profit corporation; and a
partnership established under the laws of New York.
63. Id. at *24, 9.
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number of properties and bank accounts held by the defendants. 64 In
analyzing whether the judgment creditors were entitled to turnover, the
court held that the defendants were organs of Iran because Iran had cre-
ated them for a national purpose and actively supervised them.65 The
court was mindful that the entities were created under New York law,
which would seem to violate the third prong of section 1603(b), but held
that it could disregard the entities' corporate forms, as doing otherwise
would allow Iran escape liability by transferring its assets into U.S. juridi-
cal entities.66 In 2016, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the de-
fendants did not "equate" to the state, because they "lack[ed] the
traditional attributes of statehood," and could not "be deemed 'agencies
or instrumentalities' of the state under the FSIA," because their unchal-
lenged status as citizens of New York could not be disregarded. 67
B. THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS:
THE "CORE FUNCTIONS" TEST
Although the FSIA recognizes the immunity of an "agency or instru-
mentality" of a foreign sovereign, such agencies and instrumentalities are
not always treated in the same manner as the state itself for immunity
purposes. In particular, rules relating to service of process, venue, the
availability of punitive damages, and attachment of assets can differ de-
pending on whether the defendant is deemed an agency of the state or
the state itself.6 8
To determine which FSIA rules apply, courts have applied the so-called
"core functions" test.6 9 Under this test, if the entity's predominant activi-
ties or its core functions are governmental in nature, courts will treat the
entity as if it were the state itself and apply rules and standards that are
more protective of the sovereign.70 On the other hand, if the entity's core
functions are predominantly commercial in character, courts will apply
the less protective rules and standards reserved for agencies and instru-
64. Id. at *7. The judgment creditors' actions were consolidated with an action
brought by the U.S. government for civil forfeiture of the assets, in which the U.S.
government alleged that it was entitled to forfeiture because of the defendants'
violations of money laundering and economic sanctions laws. See In re 650 Fifth
Ave. & Related Properties, 830 F.3d 66, 85 (2d Cir. 2016). In 2015, the U.S. Gov-
ernment and the judgment creditors reached a settlement regarding how any funds
obtained through the action were to be distributed. See In re 650 Fifth Ave., No.
08-cv-10934 (KBF), 2015 WL 996387, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015).
65. In re 650 Fifth Ave., 2014 WL 1516328 at *13.
66. Id.
67. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107, 123-30 (2d
Cir. 2016).
68. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)-(b) (service of process); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f)(3)-(4) (permit-
ting venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state "in any
judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or
is doing business"); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)-(b) (attachment of assets).
69. See Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran
v. Cubic Defense Sys., Inc. ("Cubic"), 495 F.3d 1024, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2007).
70. See Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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mentalities of the state.7 1 For example, the court in Worley v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, like previous courts, held that intelligence gathering and
intelligence operations were "governmental," not commercial. 7 2 There-
fore, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security would be treated
as the state for purposes of the FSIA. 7 3
In contrast, the court in NXP Semiconductors applied the core func-
tions test to determine that an entity was not a political subdivision of the
state, but merely an agency or instrumentality. 74 The plaintiff had argued
that the defendant French corporation was majority-owned by France or
a French political subdivision, and therefore fell under section 1603(b)
even if it was not itself an agency or instrumentality.7 5 The state owned
fifty percent of the corporation, but the other fifty percent was owned by
a French investment agency; the plaintiff had argued that the investment
agency was actually a subdivision of the French state, making the defen-
dant wholly owned by the government of France.7 6 The court disagreed,
noting that although the investment agency was created by statute and
controlled by the French Parliament, and it conducted banking, savings,
pension, and development services in the public interest, it was also guar-
anteed autonomy under French law, was primarily responsible for its own
finances, and was therefore a "'distinct economic enterprise"' not subject
to close political control.7 7 Accordingly, the court found that it was "not
an integral part of France's political structure, but rather that its structure
and function [were] predominantly commercial, and that it operates with
a significant degree of independence."7 8
C. ATrRIBUTING LIABILITY AND ATTACHING ASSETS: THE
PRESUMPTION OF SEPARATENESS
The distinction between the state and its agencies or instrumentalities
is also relevant in determining whether the liabilities of a state can be
attributed to an agency or instrumentality, or vice versa-both for ques-
tions regarding jurisdiction and for questions regarding enforcement
through the attachment of assets. As a general rule, agencies or instru-
mentalities are entitled to a presumption of separateness. 79 This pre-
sumption can be overcome if (1) the state has control or authority over
71. Id.
72. Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311 (D.D.C. 2014).
73. Id.
74. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. France Brevets, S.A.S., No. C 14-1225 SI, 2014
WL 4621017, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014).
75. Id. at *7.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *9 (quoting Cubic, 495 F.3d at 1034-35).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., GSS Grp. Ltd., 31 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 2014). See also Funnekotter v.
Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe, No. 13-CV-1917 (CM) (RLE),
2014 WL 4630020 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2014) (mag. op.) (holding that because judg-
ment creditor plaintiffs had not yet proved that the defendants were alter egos of
the state, they were entitled to jurisdictional discovery from the defendants about
the state's assets, but not about the defendants' own assets).
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the agency, such that either the two are not meaningfully distinct or the
state would be liable under ordinary agency principles; or (2) fraud or
injustice would result from maintaining the distinction.8 0 Several courts
in 2014 addressed this presumption of separateness.
1. Social Investment Fund-Separate from the State
In DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, the plaintiff had obtained an
arbitral award for breach of contract against the Honduran Social Invest-
ment Fund, and tried to enforce that award against Honduras.8 ' The
plaintiff relied on the arbitration exception for jurisdiction over Hondu-
ras, but that exception would apply only if the Honduran agency and the
state were not viewed as separate. 8 2 The court found that the agency's
enabling statute provided that it had an independent legal status, which
entitled it to a presumption of separateness in U.S. courts.8 3 The court
further held that the state did not completely dominate the agency such
that this presumption could be overcome: notwithstanding evidence that
the agency sometimes acted on behalf of the state, that the state could
override the agency's decisions, that ministers of the state served on the
body that functioned as the agency's board of directors, and that the state
had some financial control over the agency, the agency still had "signifi-
cant autonomy in the conduct of its daily operations." 8 4 The court also
held that no principal-agent relationship could be created unless the sov-
ereign actually exercised control over the agency.85 Thus, regardless of
what control the foreign sovereign could have exercised under the law,
because it had not exercised that control, the presumption of separate-
ness could not be overcome. 8 6 Nor did the court find fraud or injustice
sufficient to overcome the presumption of separateness. The plaintiff ar-
gued that it would be unfair not to hold the state responsible because the
plaintiff had reasonably believed that the agency "possessed the authority
of the [state]," 87 but the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to explain
how this belief was essential in inducing them to enter into the contract.8 8
Having concluded that the agency and the state were separate, the court
dismissed the plaintiff's enforcement action for lack of subject matter
80. See DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 71 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing
TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir.
2005)); see also Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 72 F. Supp. 3d 356
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that because Iraqi Ministry of Defense was a separate legal
person under Iraqi law, it was entitled to presumption of separateness and there-
fore Iraq could only be liable for breaches of agreement signed by Ministry if
plaintiff produced evidence to overcome the presumption).
81. See DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 71 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.C. 2014).
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 208-09.
84. Id. at 215.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 217.
87. Id. at 218.
88. Id.
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jurisdiction. 89
2. National Port Authority-Separate from the State
GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia also involved the enforcement
of an arbitration award.90 The plaintiff was seeking to confirm an award
against the National Port Authority of Liberia, and also added Liberia as
an additional party against whom it sought confirmation. 91 The Port Au-
thority argued that there was no personal jurisdiction under the "mini-
mum contacts" analysis.92 Minimum contacts are not required for
jurisdiction over a state, but some courts have required minimum con-
tacts for jurisdiction over agencies and instrumentalities. 93 Additionally,
there was subject matter jurisdiction over Liberia under the arbitration
exception only if the actions of the Port Authority could be attributed to
the state.94 Thus, the jurisdictional question for both defendants was
whether the Port Authority should be treated as the state.9 5 Because the
court ultimately held that the presumption of separateness had not been
overcome, the plaintiff was not able to confirm its arbitration award
against either the Port Authority or Liberia.96 The plaintiff "assert[ed]
that the [Port Authority]'s board of directors 'is wholly dominated and
controlled by the President of Liberia," but the court held that fact to be
"far from dispositive." 97 The court held that the alignment between the
Port Authority's economic interests and those of the state, and the fact
that the Port Authority's assets would return to the state if the agency was
dissolved, "'reflected only a normal relationship between a sovereign and
an instrumentality of the state.' "98 The court also held that a contract
executed years after the transaction at issue was irrelevant to the relation-
ship between the Port Authority and the state that existed when the plain-
tiff entered into its contract, and that the state's co-signing of the contract
and request to be kept apprised did not demonstrate any excessive con-
trol.99 Finally, the court held that one instance of control, where the state
directed the Port Authority to cancel its contract with the plaintiff, was
not enough to give rise to an agency relationship.' 00 Nor was there any
fraud or injustice in allowing the state to escape liability where it had
ordered the cancellation of the plaintiff's contract, because the state was
89. Id. at 219.
90. GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia, 31 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 2014).
91. Id. at 54. The plaintiff's first attempt to confirm the arbitral award against just the
National Port Authority had been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over
the Port Authority. .
92. Id. at 58.
93. See id. at 56.
94. Id. at 61-62.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id. at 63, 66.
98. Id. at 66 (quoting Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200
F.3d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66-68.
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not using the Port Authority's corporate status to gain benefits while
shielding itself from risks or to unjustly enrich itself.101 Concluding that
the state and the Port Authority were separate entities, the court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' enforcement action against both parties. 1 0 2
3. New York and United Kingdom Entities Created As Agents for
Iran-Not Separate from the State
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, although the court did not explicitly consider
the presumption of separateness, it nonetheless held that the defendant
corporate entities were not distinct from the state.1 03 In answering the
question of whether the assets of the defendants could be considered as-
sets of the state, the court held that defendants should be treated as Iran
"under an 'alter ego' theory," because of Iran's extensive control over the
defendants, concluding that defendants had "no true separate decision-
making authority or real existence except that which was allowed and
directed by the Iranian government." 1 0 4
4. Government-owned Arms Company-Separate from the State
In Williams v. Romarm, the court held that it lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, a firearms manufacturer owned by the
Romanian government.1 05 As in GSS, the question was whether the pre-
sumption of separateness had been overcome such that there was juris-
diction without regard to a minimum contacts analysis. 106 The defendant
had "'consistently' represented itself as a separate entity from the
Romanian state," and the plaintiffs had not timely provided any basis for
overcoming that separateness. 107
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY
Once a court concludes that an entity is a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state entitled to sovereign immunity under
the FSIA, the court must then decide if one of the exceptions set forth in
the FSIA applies. This Section examines how courts addressed the FSIA
exceptions in 2014.
A. WAIVER-SECTION 1605(A)(1)
The FSIA provides in section 1605(a)(1):
101. Id. at 68.
102. Id.
103. In re 650 Fifth Ave., No. 08 Civ. 10934, 2014 WL 1516328 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2014),
rev'd sub nom. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107
(2d Cir. 2016).
104. Id. at *13.
105. Williams v. Romarm, SA, 756 F.3d 777, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
106. Id. at 785.
107. Id. at 782-783. The D.C. Circuit Court declined to consider a belated, new argu-
ment that the defendant had conceded that it was not separate.
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A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . .. in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, not-
withstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver. 0 8
In 2014, the courts addressed a broad range of issues under the waiver
exception, including: (1) waiver by treaty, (2) waiver by agreeing to gov-
erning law, (3) waiver by participating in other U.S. litigation, and
(4) waiver by failing to raise the defense in a responsive pleading.
1. Waiver by Treaty
In Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, the plaintiff, an employee of a
Kenyan bank, brought an action against Kenya and its various agencies
and officials, alleging breach of contract arising from the Kenya Revenue
Authority's offer to pay a reward in exchange for information about un-
paid taxes due to the Kenyan government.1 09 The plaintiff had turned
over records implicating numerous accountholders in potential tax eva-
sion.1 ' 0 When the bank discovered the plaintiff's actions, the plaintiff be-
gan "receiving disquieting phone calls telling him to leave Kenya," and
became the victim of police harassment.' The plaintiff applied for asy-
lum in the United States, and Kenyan officials supported his application,
which was granted.11 2 The plaintiff then filed suit arguing that Kenya
owed him additional reward money." 3 The district court held that the
FSIA barred the plaintiff's suit.11^ On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
"Kenya waived its sovereign immunity.. . . [by] acced[ing] to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."1" 5 The court of appeals
held that, even if this new argument could have been raised on appeal, "it
would have little merit,"1.1 6 as the "ambiguous and generic language of
the Refugee Convention falls far short of the exacting showing required
for waivers."' 1 7 Courts will not generally find a waiver in a treaty that
"contains no mention of a waiver of immunity.""18
2. Waiver by Agreeing to Governing Law
An agreement that a contract or disputes thereunder shall be governed
by U.S. law may be deemed a waiver of sovereign immunity. In Ashraf-
Hassan v. Embassy of France, for example, the district court held that a
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2008).
109. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at 34.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 34-35.
114. Id.
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contract clause stipulating that the agreement was "to be governed by
'local legislation"' (in this case, the law of New York) constituted a
waiver of sovereign immunity.1 19
Whether such a waiver is found to exist may depend on the specificity
of the contract language and whether the parties clearly demonstrated
their intent was that U.S. law should apply to the contract. In Barapind v.
Government of the Republic of India, the defendants entered into an
agreement with the U.S. Department of State ("DOS"), stating that the
plaintiff would not be tortured upon his return to India.1 20 The plaintiff
argued that the defendants had "implicitly waived [their] sovereign im-
munity" by entering into the agreement with the DOS. 1 2 1 Although
there had been no explicit agreement that the contract would be gov-
erned by U.S. law, the court observed that the central inquiry for implied
waivers in the Ninth Circuit "is whether a sovereign contemplated the
involvement of United States courts in the affair in issue"-in other
words, how India and the DOS "envisioned the Agreement would be en-
forced."1 22 The plaintiff argued that the agreement at issue was "cen-
tered on United States domestic law and implicitly specified United
States courts for enforcement." The district court rejected the plaintiff's
argument, holding that the agreement was based on Indian law and "im-
plicitly suggests that Indian courts are the appropriate venue for re-
lief."1 2 3 The district court also held that the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary to the agreement at issue, and noted that "courts rarely find
that a nation has waived its sovereign immunity, particularly with respect
to suits brought by third parties, without strong evidence that this is what
the foreign state intended."1 2 4 The court concluded that there was no
indication that the defendants had contemplated the involvement of U.S.
courts, and therefore granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 12 5
Similarly, in A Star Group, Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro, the district court
held that one of the defendants, a Canadian public utilities board
("PUB"), had not waived immunity because it was not a party to the
agreements with the governing law and forum selection clauses.1 26 The
plaintiff and a third party signed agreements that included "a New York
governing law clause and forum selection clause."1 2 7 Pursuant to those
119. Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr., 40 F. Supp. 3d 94, 100 (D.D.C. 2014).
120. Barapind v. Gov't of the Republic of India, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1388, 1390 (E.D. Cal.
2014), aff'd, _ F.3d. _, 2016 WL 7384023 *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016).
121. Id. at 1392-93
122. Id. at 1393.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1395.
125. Id. at 1397. In 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint,
holding that the defendants "did not waive their sovereign immunity through their
diplomatic communications with the United States." Barapind v. Gov't of the Re-
public of India, _ F.3d. , 2016 WL 7384023 *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016).
126. A Star Group, Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro, No. 13 Civ. 4501 (PAC) 2014 WL 2933155
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014).
127. Id. at *1.
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agreements, the plaintiff provided the third party with certain confiden-
tial information. 128 That information was later submitted to PUB: first by
the plaintiff, who later withdrew the submission "due to confidentiality
concerns," and then by the third party.12 9 As part of PUB's regulatory
proceedings, the information was ultimately released to the public.1 30
The plaintiff argued that because PUB had "agree[d] not to violate the
terms" of the two original agreements, the forum selection clause consti-
tuted a waiver of sovereign immunity.13 1 But the court found that the
forum selection clause did not bind the utilities board, and so could not
be a waiver of immunity.1 32 The plaintiff also argued that PUB waived its
immunity by suggesting that the plaintiff retain New York counsel, but
the court held that this had "no bearing on whether PUB, itself, submit-
ted to New York jurisdiction." 133
3. Waiver by Participating in Other U.S. Litigation
In Gotham Asset Locations Inc. v. Israel, the district court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant "consented to jurisdiction" by
"implicitly waiv[ing] its sovereign immunity."1 34 The plaintiff had helped
Israel recover certain real property in the United States, including by as-
sisting Israel in intervening in estate proceedings related to Israel's title in
the property.' 3 5 The plaintiff then filed suit against Israel, seeking com-
pensation for the work it had done.1 36 In response to Israel's motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff argued that Israel had "consented to jurisdiction" by
intervening in the estate proceedings.' 3 7 The district court noted that
"[a]dmittedly, there is some authority for the proposition that a foreign
state can waive its immunity by affirmatively prosecuting litigation in the
United States," but also that such a theory requires a "direct connection
between the sovereign's activities in [the United States courts] and the
plaintiff's claims for relief." 138 Specifically, the district court found that
"the connection between [the defendant's] participation in United States-
based litigation and [p]laintiff's claims in this action [were] far too remote
to support ... waiver." 139 The court held that the defendant was immune
under the FSIA and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.1 40
128. Id. at *1-2.
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *2-3.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Gotham Asset Locators Inc. v. Isr., 27 F. Supp. 3d 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
135. Id. at 410.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 414.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 415.
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4. Waiver by Failure to Raise Immunity
In Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of France, the district court found that
the defendant, a foreign embassy, had implicitly waived sovereign immu-
nity by filing a motion to dismiss in which the foreign embassy agreed not
to contest the court's personal jurisdiction, and through the sovereign's
subsequent participation in the litigation. 14 1 The court first found that
the defendant waived sovereign immunity by entering into an employ-
ment contract with the plaintiff that "was expressly subject to U.S. law to
the exclusion of" other sources of law. 142 Additionally, the court held
that the defendant had implicitly waived sovereign immunity in its mo-
tion to dismiss, which "specifically addressed the issue of sovereign im-
munity and agreed not to challenge the Court's personal jurisdiction
unless the case should happen to 'intrude upon [the defendant's] govern-
mental activities" requiring the defendant to "protect the confidential na-
ture of such activities."1 4 3
In contrast, in Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health,
the district court explained that "under the law of [the D.C.] Circuit" the
filing of "a motion to dismiss that does not address sovereign immunity
... does not waive sovereign immunity."1 44 The court pointed out that
the D.C. Circuit "has held that implied waiver requires 'a conscious deci-
sion [by the sovereign] to take part in the litigation.'"1 4 5 The court fur-
ther held that "a motion to dismiss that omits mention of immunity will
not provide sufficient proof of such a conscious decision."1 4 6 The court
cited Ashraf-Hassan (discussed above) as an illustration of "the type of
activity a foreign sovereign must undertake to implicitly waive sovereign
immunity."1 47
Similarly, in Fraser v. Rodriguez-Espinoza, the district court concluded
that a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, both of
which asked the court to dismiss on the grounds of statute of limitations,
"d[id] not reflect a conscious decision [by the defendant] to take part in
the litigation."1 4 8 The court therefore concluded that the defendant did
not waive immunity; and thus, the claims were dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.1 4 9
141. Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr., 40 F. Supp. 3d 94, 102 (D.D.C. 2014).
142. Id. at 101.
143. Id. at 101. Although the defendant attempted to withdraw the waiver, the court
held that because the waiver could be withdrawn only "in accordance with the
terms of the waiver," and because the defendant had "offered absolutely no expla-
nation of how the 'confidential character' of its 'governmental activities' [had]
been implicated," the defendant was not able to withdraw its waiver.
144. Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 64 F. Supp. 3d 22, 31
(D.D.C. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Human v. Czech Republic-Minis-
try of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr., 40 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D.D.C. 2014)).
147. Id. at 31-32.
148. Fraser v. Rodriguez-Espinoza, No. 14 C 1046, 2014 WL 4783095, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 24, 2014).
149. Id. at *3.
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B. COMMERCIAL ACTIvITY-SECTION 1605(A)(2)
As foreign sovereigns continue to participate in the global market, the
commercial activity exception remains "one of the most frequently liti-
gated" provisions of the FSIA.1 50 This exception to immunity, codified at
section 1605(a)(2), provides that:
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts in any case where the action is based [(1)] upon a commercial ac-
tivity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [(2)] upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activ-
ity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [(3)] upon an act outside the terri-
tory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.1 51
In other words, foreign states lose immunity from suit in the U.S. when
their actions are commercial and have a nexus to the U.S. (i.e., are carried
out or have a direct effect in the U.S.). Therefore, plaintiffs may bring
claims against the state "based on" such acts, which some courts have
interpreted as "requir[ing] a 'degree of closeness between the acts giving
rise to the cause of action and those needed to establish jurisdiction that
is considerably greater than common law causation requirements. "1.5 2
1. What Acts Are Considered Commercial?
Determining the point in which a foreign state's act cross the line from
governmental to commercial is fundamental to the commercial activity
analysis, as courts define a sovereign's acts by their nature, not their pur-
pose.153 Although these are fact-intensive inquiries, they often focus on
the core principle that commercial acts are acts that any private entity
could undertake, whereas governmental acts are only possible through'.
sovereign power. Multiple federal court decisions in 2014 addressing
commercial and governmental activity are described below.
a. Contracting for Non-Civil Servant Employment at An
Embassy-Commercial
In Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of France, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia stated that employment will be considered commercial
"if an employee is contracted to work as a non-civil servant and has du-
ties of a clerical nature." 154 The plaintiff's "duties included supervising
the Embassy's internship-placement program and coordinating the Em-
150. See Crowell and Moring LLP, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2012 Year in
Review, 20 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 565, 577 (2014).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
152. Chettri v. Nepal Bangladesh Bank, Ltd., 10 Civ. 8470(PGG), 2014 WL 4354668
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
154. Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr., 40 F. Supp. 3d 94, 102 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing El-
Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 216 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
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bassy's partnership with the French-American Cultural Exchange," 1 55
and the plaintiff "'was hired in a purely administrative position, was not a
civil servant, and was not involved with governmental decisions. "'15 6 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff's claims for employment discrimination were
based on a commercial activity and the Embassy was not entitled to
immunity.15 7
b. Employment to Promote Commerce-Not Commercial
In Kim v. Korea Trade Promotion-Investment Agency, the plaintiff
brought claims for employment discrimination against a Korean agency
established to promote the sale of Korean goods and services in the
United States.158 Even though the plaintiff alleged that the agency was
involved in the marketing and selling of goods and services, and that he
was employed as a sales agent, the court found that the agency was not
engaged in commerce, but rather in the promotion of commerce. 159 Find-
ing the promotion of commerce to be a governmental endeavor, the court
held that the commercial activity exception did not apply.16 0
c. Confiscating Money-Not Commercial
Unsurprisingly, in Ezeiruaku v. Bull, the court held that the London
police had not engaged in commercial activity when they confiscated the
plaintiff's money during a seizure.1 61 The plaintiff argued that the po-
lice's actions constituted commercial activity because the police were able
to profit by accruing interest on the funds seized from the plaintiff.162
The court disagreed, holding that the seizure of the plaintiff's money was
an exercise of police power and therefore a "quintessentially sovereign
act." 163
d. Utilities Regulator Paying for Reports During an Investigation-
Not Commercial
In A Star Group, Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro, the district court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that PUB had engaged in commercial activity when it
obtained confidential information from the plaintiff.164 In a suit over the
public release of confidential information, the plaintiff argued that it had
a commercial agreement with PUB to supply "commercial services infor-
155. Id. at 97.
156. Id. at 103 (quoting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).
157. Id.
158. Kim v. Korea Trade Promotion-Investment Agency, 51 F. Supp. 3d 279, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
159. Id. at 286-88.
160. Id.
161. Ezeiruaku v. Bull, 2014 WL 5587404, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2014).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. A Star Group, Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro, No. 13 Civ. 4501(PAC) 2014 WL 2933155
at *5 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2014).
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mation related to the PUB's review of [one of the defendants]."1 6 5 The
district court disagreed, noting that PUB had "explicitly declined to re-
tain" the plaintiff, and instead requested only the information, while also
"agree[ing] to pay the costs associated with that request. This is not com-
mercial activity; rather, it is routine practice for a regulatory body during
the course of an investigation."1 6 6 Additionally, because PUB's use of
the plaintiff's confidential information was "in furtherance of" PUB's
regulatory investigation, the court found its release was not commercial
activity.167
e. Regulating the Aluminum Market by Manipulating Prices-Not
Commercial
In In re Aluminum Warehousing, the plaintiffs alleged that the London
Metal Exchange had engaged in a conspiracy to restrain the output of
aluminum, and thereby increase the price. 168 As part of the Exchange's
activities, it oversees the trade of metals through warehouses all over the
world.169 The plaintiffs alleged that the Exchange's rules for the ware-
house operations led to inflated prices for aluminum. 170 The court held
that because it is the nature, and not the purpose, of an activity that mat-
ters, it was irrelevant whether the Exchange had engaged in the conduct
in bad faith.1 71 The court found that the Exchange's warehousing activi-
ties "serve a vital and necessary role in enabling the [Exchange] to regu-
late the aluminum market," and therefore are regulatory, not
commercial, in nature.1 72 Although the plaintiffs argued that the activi-
ties were quintessentially commercial because they were contractual in
nature, the court held that the contractual arrangements at issue served a
regulatory purpose.1 73 Accordingly, the court held that it had no jurisdic-
tion over the claims.174
f. Leasing Property and Maintaining Bank Accounts-Commercial
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, the court held that leasing property, which
resulted in substantial revenue, constituted commercial behavior. 75 Al-
though the defendants argued that certain rent-free or reduced rent




168. In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation, No. 13-md-2481 (KBF), 2014
WL 4211353 at *1, 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2014) (slip op.).
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. at *1.
171. Id. at *14.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *15 (observing that the contracts at issue "were not negotiated at arms-
length, but rather were offered on a mandatory, 'take it or leave it' basis.").
174. Id.
175. In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, No. 08 Civ. 10934 (KBF), 2014 WL
1516328 at *17-19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2014).
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should be viewed as charitable donations instead of commercial activity,
the court held that they were not true donations, as the tenants compen-
sated the owners by assuming certain liabilities, including insurance,
taxes, and utility fees.17 6 Regardless of any charitable purpose, because
the defendants leased real property in exchange for financial benefit, the
nature of the leases was commercial.177 Finally, the plaintiffs also sought
to attach various bank accounts belonging to one of the defendants,
which the defendant admitted was used to support its general opera-
tions.17 8 The court found that the defendant used the bank account just
as a private party would, and therefore used the account for a commercial
purpose.1 79
g. Foreign Adoption-Commercial
Although in McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Bd. of the Republic
of the Philippines the court acknowledged that although adoption "is not
primarily a commercial activity," it still held that "the process of adop-
tion, which entails numerous contracts and often an exchange of money,
undoubtedly affects commerce."18 0 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's suit to enjoin the removal of a child from a pre-adop-
tive home fell under the commercial activity exception.' 8 1
2. What Acts Create a Nexus with the United States?
Once a court has determined that a foreign sovereign has engaged in
commercial activity under the FSIA, it must then decide whether that
activity has sufficient nexus with the U.S. to satisfy the commercial activ-
ity exception. That nexus can exist in one of three circumstances: (1) the
foreign sovereign carried on commercial activity in the U.S.; (2) the chal-
lenged act took place in the U.S. in connection with the foreign sover-
eign's commercial activity abroad; or (3) the foreign sovereign acted
outside the U.S. in connection with its commercial activity elsewhere, and
this activity caused a direct effect in the U.S. 1 82
a. Acts in the United States by Foreign States
The first clause of the commercial activity exception permits jurisdic-
tion of commercial acts "carried on in the United States" by foreign
states. 183 Not all commercial acts, however, will be sufficient to grant
jurisdiction.
176. Id. at *17.
177. Id. at *18.
178. Id. at *20.
179. Id.
180. McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Bd. of the Republic of the Phil., 62 F.
Supp. 3d 187, 191-192 (D. Mass. 2014).
181. Id. at 188-92.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
183. Id.
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i. Sending Agents and Materials to the U.S. to Market Securities-
Sufficient
In dicta in Atlantica Holding, the court held that the defendant's con-
duct met this first prong of the commercial activity test where the defen-
dant had induced investment by the plaintiffs (and other U.S. investors)
by sending agents to the United States to meet with investors and sending
information about the securities to the United States.1 84
ii. Mere Business Meetings in the U.S.-Insufficient
The plaintiff in Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya argued that Kenya's
failure to pay him reward money that had been offered to anyone provid-
ing information about tax evaders was a commercial activity.18 5 The
plaintiff further alleged that the activity partially took place in the United
States because he conducted meetings with Kenyan officials in the United
States.186 The court rejected this argument, holding that "mere business
meetings" did not create sufficient contact.187 Similarly, the court in
Schoeps v. Bayern held that there was no commercial activity in the
United States where a meeting in the U.S. did not result in a contract, or
even a legally binding offer, to sell a painting, but only an agreement to
talk further.188
b. Acts in the United States in Connection with Commercial
Activity Abroad
The second clause of the commercial activity exception under Section
1605(a)(2) provides for jurisdiction where the challenged acts-including
potentially non-commercial acts-take place in the U.S. but are "in con-
nection with" the sovereign's commercial activity abroad. 89 As is the
case generally with the commercial activity exception, those acts must
also form the basis of the suit.
The federal courts found few opportunities in 2014 to address substan-
tively the second clause of the commercial activity exception. The courts
that did address this clause found that the acts in the U.S. were not legally
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.
The plaintiffs in Chettri v. Nepal Bangladesh Bank, Ltd. relied on the
second clause for their claims against defendants for freezing a bank ac-
count in Nepal.1 90 According to the plaintiffs, the freeze was "part and
parcel" of a commercial transaction with a U.S. company, and because
the defendants had contracted with that U.S. company, they "must have
184. Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 2 F. Supp.
3d 550, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd in part, 813 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016), 2016 WL
403445.
185. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
186. Id. at 36.
187. Id.
188. Schoeps v. Bayern, 27 F. Supp. 3d 540, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
190. Chettri v. Nepal Bangladesh Bank, Ltd., No. 10 CIV. 8470 (PGG), 2014 WL
4354668 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014).
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foreseen" jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.191 The court disagreed, holding
that the complaint was not based on the commercial contracts, but on the
sovereign act of freezing the bank account. 192 Because all the actions
related to the freezing took place in Nepal, the second clause did not
apply.1 93
In both Schoeps and Odhiambo, the courts also considered the second
clause, but held that the analysis was essentially the same as under the
first clause. Accordingly, the Schoeps court held that the preliminary
meeting to discuss the possible sale of a painting was "of no legal conse-
quence" and therefore could not constitute commercial activity with a
substantial connection to the United States.1 94 The court in Odhiambo
likewise rejected the plaintiff's argument under the second prong for the
same reason it rejected the arguments under the first-even if the alleged
meetings in the U.S. were "in connection" with a commercial activity, the
plaintiffs' claims were not based on those meetings. 195
c. Acts Outside the United States that Cause a "Direct Effect" in
the United States
The third clause of the commercial activity exception permits jurisdic-
tion over acts that occur outside the U.S., but which cause a "direct ef-
fect" in the U.S.1 9 6 This third category was discussed in several cases in
2014, as courts grappled with the distinction between a "direct" and an
"indirect" effect.
i. Failure to Pay-Sometimes Direct
In 2014, courts continued to struggle with whether payment obligations
have a "direct effect" in the United States. The court in Odhiambo con-
cluded that, in the D.C. Circuit, there was a "very clear line" in the
analysis:
For purposes of clause three of the FSIA commercial activity excep-
tion, breaching a contract that establishes or necessarily contem-
plates the United States as a place of performance causes a direct
effect in the United States, while breaching a contract that does not
establish or necessarily contemplate the United States as a place of




194. Schoeps, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
195. Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 37-38.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see Tarsavage v. CITIC Trust Co., 3 F. Supp. 3d 137, 145
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating in a footnote that the test for direct effect overlapped
with the Second Circuit's long-arm jurisdiction test, which asks, in cases "[w]here
tlge conduct that forms the basis for the controversy occurs entirely out-of-forum,
and the only relevant jurisdictional contacts are the in-forum effects harmful to the
plaintiff," whether "the defendant expressly aimed its conduct at the forum.") (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
197. Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 40.
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Accordingly, the court found that failure to pay money allegedly owed
pursuant to a general offer to pay a reward did not have a direct effect in
the United States, where the offer was made in Kenya and did not specify
any place of payment.19 8 The facts that Kenya helped the plaintiff immi-
grate to the United States and that some payments were made in the
United States were not sufficient to show a "direct effect." 199 The dis-
sent, however, rejected the "clear line" drawn by the majority, concluding
that the direct effects test was met under a "holistic analysis." 200
Most courts have agreed with the Odhiambo majority, finding that a
mere promise to pay, without some promise to pay in the United States,
is not sufficient to show a direct effect in the United States.201 In Araya-
Solarzano, the court concluded that there was no "direct effect" where
the only connection to the United States was that the plaintiffs lived in
the United States, were citizens, and included in their acceptance of a
contract that payment would be made in U.S. dollars. 202 Similarly, in
GMI, LLC v. Associacion del Futbol Argentino, the court held there was
no direct effect where the plaintiff never designated the U.S. as the place
of payment, but only "intended" to do so, and it was not clear that such a
designation, had it been made, would have bound the relevant parties.203
And the court in Kettey concluded that, where the plaintiff did not allege
there was any arrangement to pay in the United States, there was no di-
rect effect.204
ii. Marketing Securities to United States Investors-Direct
In Atlantica Holding, the court held that the defendant created a "di-
rect effect" where it had created a subsidiary to market securities in the
U.S., sent information to qualified buyers in the U.S., sent agents to meet
with investors in the U.S., and made false statements that resulted in
losses to U.S. investors.20 5 According to the court, the defendant "plainly
contemplated investment by United States persons and indeed success-
fully subscribed twenty-fivepercent of the [securities] offering with indi-
viduals within the United States." 206
198. Id. at 41.
199. Id. at 40-42.
200. Id. at 50 (Pillard, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998)
("[W]e hold that a financial loss incurred in the United States by an American
plaintiff, if it is an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity, constitutes a
direct effect.").
202. Araya Solorzano v. Gov't of Republic of Nicaragua, 562 Fed. Appx. at 905.
203. GMI, LLC v. Associacion del Futbol Argentino, No. 13-21494-CIV, 2014 WL
2818663 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2014).
204. Kettey, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 51-52.
205. Atlantica Holding, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 557-58.
206. Id. at 558.
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iii. Effect on the Art Market-Not Direct
In Schoeps, the plaintiffs argued that allowing the defendant to get
away with the purchase of a stolen art work, where the purchase was
structured to avoid U.S. tax consequences, would have a "disastrous" ef-
fect on the art market in the United States and would further an alleged
criminal conspiracy to evade taxes. 2 0 7 The court rejected these argu-
ments as "balderdash," holding that the claimed effects were not "direct"
effects for purposes of the FSIA.2 0 8
iv. Freezing a Bank Account Outside the United States-Not
Direct
In Chettri, the court held that freezing a bank account in Nepal, and
thus allegedly interfering with the plaintiffs' supply contracts with the
Nepalese government, did not cause a direct effect in the United
States. 2 0 9 Mere financial injury in the United States from the freeze was
not sufficient; the actual direct effect was to prevent payments to third-
party subcontractors in Nepal to satisfy the supply contracts. 2 10
3. "Based Upon"
It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege a qualifying commercial activity
that has some connection with the claim alleged; a plaintiff must show
that its claims arise from or are "based upon" the commercial activity
described.2 1 1 If the alleged commercial conduct is not part of the conduct
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, then the commercial activity ex-
ception will not apply.
For example, the claims in Smith Rocke Ltd. v. Republica Bolivariana
de Venezuela arose from the Venezuelan state's alleged conversion of two
financial institutions in Venezuela and their assets, which occurred when
a Venezuelan agency placed them in receivership then ordered their liqui-
dation.2 12 Those institutions possessed some rights in notes issued by the
U.S. financial institution Lehman Brothers ("the Lehman notes"), which
also was in receivership. 213 The Venezuelan regulators participated in the
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings for Lehman Brothers, to assert the rights of
the Venezuelan banks, and the plaintiff alleged that this participation
constituted commercial activity that gave the court jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's conversion claims.2 1 4 The court disagreed. Even if the Vene-
zuelan state's post-conversion actions on behalf of the banks could be
considered commercial activity, the court found that the plaintiff's claims
207. Schoeps, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 546.
208. Id.
209. Chettri, 2014 WL 4354668 at *15.
210. Id. at *15-16.
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
212. Smith Rocke Ltd. v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 12-Cv-7316(LGS),
2014 WL 288705 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id. at *4.
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were not based on those actions because those actions would not entitle
the plaintiff to any relief.215 Instead, the plaintiff's claims were based on
the alleged conversion by the state-claims which had to be analyzed
under the expropriation exception. 2 1 6
Similarly, in Chettri, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
commercial activity exception applied because the government froze as-
sets that were part of a commercial transaction. The court held that the
plaintiffs' claims were not based on the commercial contracts, but on the
act of freezing the bank account.2 17
The court in Odhiambo also examined this question, holding that the
plaintiff's claims were not based on the U.S. meetings that the plaintiff
had argued constituted the relevant commercial activity. 218 According to
the court, "clause one requires a plaintiff's claim to be 'based upon' the
aspect of the foreign state's commercial activity that establishes a sub-
stantial contact with the United States." 219 The plaintiff did not meet this
test, as the meetings, which were "the only aspect of Kenya's commercial
activity that allegedly established substantial contact with the United
States," were "not necessary to make out any element of [plaintiff's]
breach-of-contract claim." 2 2 0
The court in Schoeps, in addition to holding that there was no legally
sufficient commercial activity, also held that the plaintiffs' claims were
not "based on" the alleged commercial activity.2 2 1 The plaintiffs had
sued the current owner of a painting, alleging commercial acts related to
the buying of the painting in the 1960s. 22 2 The true wrongful conduct,
however, had occurred in the 1930s, when a Jewish banker in Germany
was forced to transfer the painting because of Nazi persecution. 2 2 3 Ac-
cording to the court, the suit was not based on the defendant's acquisition
of the painting, but on the decades-earlier forced transfer to the previous
owner, with no involvement by the defendant.224
In Kettey, the court held that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit related to his employ-
ment contract to teach in Saudi Arabia holding that "[a]lthough Plaintiff
was interviewed in the United States and signed his contract in the
United States, the elements of Plaintiff's ... claims that would entitle him
to relief are his performance and Defendant's nonpayment, both of which
215. Id. at *5.
216. Id. at *5.
217. Chettri, 2014 WL at *13 ("[T]he 'gravamen' of the Complaint is not [the] supply
contracts with the government of Nepal, but rather the [] freez[ing] of the $1
million.")
218. Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 37.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Schoeps, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 544.
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occurred in Saudi Arabia." 225 The court did, however, find that it had
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim, because that
claim was based on alleged "fraudulent representations to Plaintiff at the
time Plaintiff signed the Contract in the United States," and the signing
of the contract was "in connection with" the commercial activity of teach-
ing in Saudi Arabia. 226
C. TAKINGS-SECTION 1605(A)(3)
The FSIA provides in section 1605(a)(3):
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or in-
strumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.22 7
In 2014, federal courts decided several cases in which plaintiffs alleged
that the sovereign defendant should be subject to jurisdiction based on
the FSIA's "takings" (or "expropriation") exception. It is settled that a
sovereign's taking of the property of its own citizens, no matter how egre-
gious, does not constitute a "violation of international law" sufficient to
confer jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(3). 228 Thus, in two of the three
cases described below, the focus was the citizenship of the plaintiffs and/
or their predecessors for purposes of analyzing whether the takings at
issue violated international law.
In LaLoup v. United States, the parents of a U.S. Marine who died
while stationed in Greece brought an action against the United States,
the U.S. Department of Defense, Greece, and a Greek hospital, asserting
claims for mishandling of their son's body after he committed suicide, and
for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from
the removal of their son's heart during his autopsy in Greece, and the
defendants' failure to disclose this information to the plaintiffs. 2 2 9 The
Greek defendants asserted sovereign immunity and the plaintiffs argued
that the expropriation exception to the FSIA governed the case. 2 3 0
The court found that the plaintiffs had a "quasi-property" right in their
son's body arising out of, and limited to, their burial duties. 2 3 1 The court
explained that because the plaintiffs were unable to bury the body with
225. Kettey, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
226. Id. at 52.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
228. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976).
229. LaLoup v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 3d 530, 533-35 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
230. Id. at 545
231. Id. at 548.
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the heart in it, they were deprived of that right.2 3 2 However, the district
court explained that the plaintiffs did not have an interest in the body
that could be compensated by money; as such, the court concluded that
the provision requiring "just compensation" did not contemplate the type
of "taking" at issue in this case. 2 3 3 The court also found that the taking of
the heart was not for a public purpose. 234 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the activities the plaintiffs alleged did not fall within the
meaning of section 1605(a)(3), and so the court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the Greek
defendants. 235
In Smith Rocke Ltd., the plaintiff also argued that the court had juris-
diction over its claims for conversion under the expropriation excep-
tion.2 3 6 Among the assets of the expropriated financial institutions were
the "Lehman Notes," and the court found that the right to payment
under those notes was a right to property, and thus satisfied the first ele-
ment of 1605(a)(3). 237 For the second element of section 1605(a)(3), the
district court concluded that the property at issue was "nationalized" by
the defendant and thus was "taken" for FSIA purposes. 238 For the third
element, however, the district court concluded that the taking was not in
violation of international law because the defendant was only "taking"
from its own citizens.239 Ultimately the court concluded that without a
violation of international law, the expropriation exception could not ap-
ply, and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 240
In Chettri, where the plaintiffs brought claims for the freezing of a bank
account in Nepal, the court determined that the second prong of the tak-
ings exception did not apply for several reasons. 2 4 1 First, that prong re-
quires that the taken property be "owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality" of the sovereign (unless the property is actually in the
United States); 242 because the plaintiffs alleged that the property had
been taken by the government itself, rather than an agency or instrumen-
tality, this requirement was not met.2 4 3 Second, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not exhausted remedies in Nepal, which was required
before the plaintiffs could bring a takings claim. 2 4 4 Third, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the freezing of a
bank account, pursuant to a money laundering investigation, constituted
232. Id.
233. Id. at 549.
234. Id. at 550.
235. Id.
236. Smith Rocke Ltd., 2014 WL 288705, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
237. Id. at *5-6.
238. Id. at *7.
239. Id. at *7-10.
240. Id. at *10-11.
241. Chettri, 2014 WL 4354668 at *12-19.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
243. Chettri, 2014 WL 4354668 at *17.
244. Id.
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a taking. 24 5 Finally, by transferring money into the Nepalese bank ac-
count, the plaintiffs had voluntarily agreed to submit to the laws of Nepal,
including those governing money laundering.2 46 Although the plaintiffs
complained that Nepal had deliberately prolonged the time during which
the bank account was frozen, the length of the freeze was not sufficient to
transform it into a taking, especially where Nepal had been engaged in an
active investigation. 2 4 7
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS-SECTION 1605(A)(5)
The "noncommercial tort" or "tortious activity" exception of the FSIA
subjects a sovereign entity to jurisdiction in the U.S. for claims based on
actions "in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that for-
eign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment." 2 4 8
The FSIA limits the noncommercial tort exception in two significant
ways. First, it excludes claims based on the "exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform" any "discretionary function." 2 4 9 Sec-
ond, the Act excludes claims stemming from alleged "malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights." 2 5 0 Thus, the exception applies to "rela-
tively few situations." 2 5 1
Some courts in 2014 declined to apply section 1605(a)(5) when the al-
leged tortious conduct occurred outside of the United States. For exam-
ple, in Fernandez v. Spain, the plaintiff, a Spanish national, alleged that
Spain had "consciously and wantonly" violated his rights throughout the
prosecution of a criminal case against him that was related to embezzle-
ment of public funds. 2 5 2 The district court concluded that it was "undeni-
able" that the legal proceedings at the heart of the case took place
outside of the United States (in Spain), and therefore the FSIA exception
for noncommercial torts did not apply. 2 5 3 The district court dismissed the
245. Id. at *18.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
249. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A). This exclusion applies "regardless of whether the discretion is
abused." Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 81 n.4
(D.D.C. 2013), affd, 782 F.3d 9, 2015 WL 1499342 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
251. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 116 n.8 (2d Cir.
2013) (noting that the legislative history of the FSIA suggests that Congress's prin-
cipal purpose in implementing the noncommercial tort exception "'was to enable
officials and employees of foreign sovereigns to be held liable for the traffic acci-
dents which they cause in this country, whether or not in the scope of their official
business"').
252. Fernandez v. Spain, 2014 WL 1807069, at *1 (D.P.R. May 6, 2014).
253. Id. at *2.
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case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 5 4
Similarly, in Ezeiruaku v. Bull, the plaintiff alleged that the London
police seized $80,000 in "undisclosed" U.S. currency at London's
Heathrow International Airport, and contended that the court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the police on the basis of a number of excep-
tions to the FSIA, including the tortious activity exception.2 55 The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument as to the tortious activity exception, ex-
plaining that the exception is limited to torts occurring within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States.256 Because the plaintiff's allegations
established that the events in question occurred outside of the United
States ("clearly . . . within the territorial jurisdiction of the United King-
dom"), this exception did not apply. 2 5 7
In Richardson v. Attorney General of British Virgin Islands, there was a
dispute as to whether the tortious activity occurred in U.S. territorial wa-
ters or in the territorial waters of the foreign sovereign.258 The plaintiffs
were passengers on a power boat that was stopped by a customs officer
for the government of the British Virgin Islands ("BVI"), who ordered
the plaintiffs to come aboard his boat. 259 The plaintiffs alleged that they
sustained injures because the officer did not safely operate his boat, and
thereafter filed a negligence action against the Attorney General of BVI
and against the officer himself.260 The defendants argued that they were
immune under the FSIA, and submitted documents that appeared to be
judgments from the BVI wherein the plaintiffs pled guilty to illegal entry
into the BVI.26 1 The district court concluded, however, that it was un-
clear that the documents were, in fact, judgments, and also questioned
whether the judgments should be recognized, given that the plaintiffs al-
leged they had been forced to sign the documents while one of them was
suffering from severe injuries from the boating accident.2 6 2 As there was
other evidence on the record showing that the incident had occurred in
the territorial waters of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the district court con-
cluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate "by a preponderance of
the evidence that the tortious activity exemption [did] not apply," and
therefore the court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction. 263
E. ARBITRATION-SECTION1605(A)(6)
The FSIA provides in section 1605(a)(6):
254. Id.
255. Ezeiruaku v. Bull, 2014 WL 5587404 at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2014).
256. Id. at *7.
257. Id.




261. Id. at *5.
262. Id. at *5-7.
263. Id. at *8.
169
170 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the
action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the for-
eign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbi-
tration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to
confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate,
if
(A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the
United States,
(B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or
other international agreement in force for the United States calling
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,
(C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could
have been brought in a United States court under this Section or
section 1607, or
(D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable. 264
In 2014, several U.S. courts examined the arbitration exception. In
Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, the plaintiff
sought to enforce an arbitration award related to the defendant's alleged
interference with a business relationship between the plaintiff and a third
party.265 To enforce the award, the plaintiff attempted to rely on the New
York Convention as the source of jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign
defendant.266 First, the district court found that subsection 1605(a)(6)(A)
did not apply because the arbitration took place in the Czech Republic. 2 6 7
Second, the court concluded that subsection 1605(a)(6)(C) did not apply
because the underlying claim could not have been brought in a United
States court using any of the exceptions listed in sections 1605 or 1607
(and the plaintiff failed to assert that any other sections applied). 268
Third, the court found that 1605(a)(6)(D) did not apply because the facts
did not support a finding of implicit or explicit waiver.269 Finally, al-
though the plaintiff did not specifically invoke subsection 1605(a)(6)(B),
the court noted that it did not apply because the case did not fall within
the scope of the New York Convention. 270 As such, the court dismissed
the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 271 In 2016, the
D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff "satisfied its burden of
showing that its arbitration award 'may be governed' by the New York
Convention because" the plaintiff had a commercial relationship with the
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
265. Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 64 F. Supp. 3d 22
(D.D.C. 2014)
266. Id. at 28.
267. Id. at 32.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 32-33.
270. Id. at 33.
271. Id.
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Czech Republic. 2 7 2
In DRC, Inc., the district court conducted an in-depth analysis of the
arbitration exception as it relates to government instrumentalities. 2 7 3 The
plaintiff had obtained an arbitration award against the Honduran Social
Investment Fund ("HSIF"), and sought to enforce that award against the
state.2 7 4 The state asserted that it was immune, and the plaintiff at-
tempted to rely on the arbitration exception to the FSIA. 27 5 The district
court explained that "[tihere is no dispute that, had this confirmation ac-
tion been brought against HSIF, the award debtor, the Court would have
subject matter jurisdiction." 276 But because the action was against the
Republic itself, the district court had to analyze the case under the line of
cases addressing government instrumentalities. 277 The court held that
HSIF was entitled to a presumption of separateness from the state, and
that no basis existed for disregarding that separateness. 2 7 8 Accordingly,
the arbitration exception did not apply as to the defendant Republic, and
the court therefore granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plain-
tiff's petition to confirm the award. 2 7 9
In GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia, the district court similarly
examined whether a sovereign non-signatory to an arbitration agreement
can be held responsible for payment of an arbitration award on the the-
ory that an agent of the sovereign was a signatory to the agreement. 2 8 0
The plaintiff in that case sought confirmation of a $44 million arbitral
award issued against National Port Authority of Liberia ("NPA") arising
out of the plaintiff's claim that NPA breached a contract.28 1 The plaintiff
named not just NPA, but also the Republic of Liberia, on the theory that
NPA had acted as Liberia's agent.2 8 2 The district court analyzed whether
NPA should be afforded a presumption of independence. The court
agreed with the defendants that none of the purported links alleged by
the plaintiff established that Liberia dominated the NPA or that the NPA
acted as the government's agent. 2 8 3 The court therefore concluded that
Liberia was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the court lacked ju-
risdiction over that defendant.2 8 4
272. Human v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
273. DRC. Inc., 2014 WL 5390182, at *1.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *34.
276. Id. at *4.
277. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611 (1983) ("Bancec") (establishing that "government instrumentalities estab-
lished as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should
normally be treated as such"); see also Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica
de Venezuela, 200 F. 3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that government instru-
mentalities enjoy a "presumption of separateness" from the sovereign).
278. 2014 WL 5390182, at *8-12 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2014).
279. Id. at *12.
280. GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia, 31 F. Supp. 3d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2014)
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 64.
284. Id. at 68.
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F. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM-SECTION 1605A
In 2014, courts continued to grapple with the nuances of the "terrorism
exception" to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. This exception was
enacted in 1996, as Section 1605(a)(7), to allow victims of terrorism to sue
foreign sovereigns that have been designated by the U.S. Department of
State as "state sponsor[s] of terrorism," as well as the agencies and instru-
mentalities of those states.2 85 Sovereigns so designated lose their immu-
nity from suit if they were designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
either at the time of the terrorist act, or subsequently, as a direct result of
the act that is the subject of the litigation. 286
Section 1605(a)(7) did not provide plaintiffs with a federal cause of
action; rather, it simply granted the courts jurisdiction to decide certain
claims.287 Nor did it permit the award of punitive damages against state
sponsors of terrorism. 2 88 In 2008, Congress amended the exception, en-
acting a new section 1605A, to provide for a more uniform approach to
compensating victims of state-sponsored terrorism, as well as to provide a
greater deterrent to state-sponsored terrorism. 289 Actions filed under
section 1605(a)(7) that were ongoing at the time of the amendment could
be treated "as if the action had originally been filed" pursuant to section
1605A. 2 90 Additionally, for sixty days post-judgment in any action that
had validly invoked section 1605(a)(7), plaintiffs could bring any other
action arising out of the same event under section 1605A. 2 9 1
To invoke the exception, a plaintiff also must allege that the sovereign
defendant participated in an act in furtherance of a terrorist objective.
Such acts include an "act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabo-
tage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for
such an act." 292 The FSIA further limits claims to those brought by plain-
tiffs who are U.S. nationals, members of the U.S. armed forces, employ-
ees or agents of the United States, or legal representatives of these
individuals. 293 A plaintiff meeting any one of these categories must then
demonstrate causation and damages in order to potentially hold a foreign
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Country Reports on Terrorism 2014,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016). In 2015, the State Department removed Cuba from the list, leaving
only Iran, Sudan, and Syria.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiff's claim did not fall within FSIA terrorism
exception where Cuba was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time of his alleged torture, nor designated as such as a result of his alleged
torture).
287. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7).
288. Id.
289. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), Pub. L. No.
110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
290. NDAA § 1083(c)(2); see, e.g., In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, No. 08
Civ. 10934(KBF), 2014 WL 1998233, *5 (May 14, 2014, S.D.N.Y.).
291. NDAA § 1083(c)(3).
292. Id. § 1605A(a)(1).
293. Id. § 1605A(c).
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sovereign liable under the FSIA.2 9 4
1. Implementing the Exception
a. Evidentiary Burden
The FSIA grants jurisdiction to courts only where a plaintiff pleads
(and ultimately produces) satisfactory evidence that a foreign state's con-
duct falls within one of the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immu-
nity.2 9 5 Plaintiffs may produce evidence in the form of not only live
witnesses, but also affidavits or declarations, 2 9 6 and a court may accept
uncontroverted evidence as true.297
In 2014, as in previous years, courts took judicial notice of evidence
presented inprevious cases without requiring the evidence to be resubmit-
ted. 2 9 8 But the extent to which this satisfied a plaintiff's evidentiary bur-
den varied by court. For example, in Opati v. Republic of Sudan, the
court observed that, while it may take judicial notice of, and give effect
to, its own records from another related proceeding, it may not follow the
findings of prior proceedings without making its own independent find-
ings of fact, based on that evidence. 2 9 9
"Plaintiffs seeking to invoke the terrorism exception based on torture
(as opposed to "a targeted bombing or a deliberate execution") face the
unique evidentiary burden of meeting the statutory definition of tor-
ture." 30 0 As explained in our 2013 review, in Han Kim v. Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, the plaintiffs were relatives of a reverend
who was allegedly abducted by agents of North Korea, tortured, and ulti-
mately killed.3 0 1 The plaintiffs sought a default judgment against North
Korea.3 0 2 The lower court had found that the plaintiffs could not meet
the high evidentiary bar for torture under the FSIA, i.e., the definition of
torture in Section 3 of the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), be-
cause they had not produced "first-hand evidence" of what had happened
to the Reverend. 303 In 2014, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and reversed the
lower court's judgment.304 The court emphasized that the secrecy with
which a state like North Korea operates undoubtedly makes it difficult
for plaintiffs to bring direct evidence of torture.3 05 But the crucial evi-
dence was records from a South Korean court that had convicted a North
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Jerez, 775 F.3d 419, 423-24.
296. Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1080 (N. D. Ill. 2014).
297. Id.; see also Worley 75 F. Supp. 3d at 319.
298. See, e.g., Leibovitch, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1075-76, 1080.
299. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2014).
300. See Crowell and Moring LLP, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2013 Year in
Review, 21 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 241, 286 (2015).




304. Id. at 1045.
305. Id. at 1049.
173
174 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
Korean intelligence agent for, among other crimes, abducting Reverend
Kim.3 0 6 That evidence, combined with expert testimony establishing
North Korea's practice of torturing and killing prisoners like the Rever-
end and also its use of terror and intimidation to suppress witness testi-
mony, was enough for the court to "reach the logical conclusion" that the
plaintiffs' evidence satisfied the TVPA's definition of torture. 307 It thus
directed the lower court to enter a default judgment against North Korea
and noted that North Korea could seek to vacate that judgment should it
disagree with the court's decision. 308
b. Causation
In order to avail themselves of the terrorism exception under section
1605A, plaintiffs also must "'prove a theory of liability' which justifies
holding the defendants culpable for the injuries that the plaintiffs have
allegedly suffered."3 0 9 Plaintiffs need not, however, plead "but-for" cau-
sation; they may rely instead on a reasonable causal link.310 Courts con-
sidering a FSIA claim under the terrorism exception "must articulate the
justification for such recovery, generally through the lens of civil tort
liability." 311
A foreign state need not be directly involved in an act of terrorism to
be held liable under the FSIA. 3 1 2 Section 1605A also provides for liabil-
ity if a state sponsor of terrorism provides material support or resources
for a terrorist attack. 313 In Kaplan v. Central Bank of Islamic Republic of
Iran, the court found that both North Korea and Iran were liable to the
plaintiffs for their role in providing "material support" to Hezbollah in
connection with Hezbollah rocket attacks. 314 Specifically, the court
found that North Korea had provided Hezbollah with advanced weapons,
expert advice and construction assistance in hiding the weapons in under-
ground bunkers, and training on how to use the weapons and bunkers.3 15
Meanwhile, the court found that Iran had financed North Korea's assis-
tance, and also helped transport weapons into Hezbollah's hands. 316
306. Id. at 1051.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 334-35 (citing Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 73 (D.D.C.2010)); see also 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a)(1) (requiring
causation).
310. See Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 325.
311. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
312. See 28 U.S.C. 1605A.
313. See Kaplan v. Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 55 F. Supp. 3d 189, 198
(D.D.C. 2014) (citing § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)).
314. Id. at 200.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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c. Waiver
In 2014, courts continued to address the effect of section 1605A-or
lack thereof-on claims previously filed pursuant to section 1605(a)(7).
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, the plaintiffs had obtained a default judgment
against Iran and its Ministry of Information & Security for both compen-
satory and punitive damages. 317 They then submitted applications to the
U.S. Treasury Department for payment pursuant to the Victims of Traf-
ficking and Violence Protection Act ("TVPA").318 Each application
stated that the plaintiffs "hereby relinquish . . . all rights and claims to
punitive damages awarded in connection with the claim or claims ...
brought under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) and any related interest, costs, and
attorneys fees." 319 The plaintiffs received some, but not all, of their judg-
ment through the TVPA funds.320 Several years later in 2010, the plain-
tiffs converted their action to one under section 1605A and pursued an
action against various building owners affiliated with Iran to satisfy the
remainder of the default judgment, including its punitive damages. 32 1
The court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to recover the punitive damages.
Although the plaintiffs had converted their action to one under section
1605A, that conversion did not create new rights to punitive damages that
the plaintiffs had previously relinquished when receiving payment under
the TVPA. 3 2 2 The court held that the plaintiffs had waived their right to
punitive damages in exchange for the partial payment. 323
2. Choice of Law Issues
In 2014, courts continued to confront difficult choice-of-law questions
in applying the terrorism exception. Indeed, the presence of non-citizen
plaintiffs, foreign law, and competing interests in combating terror have
led courts to confront difficult questions regarding the applicable rule of
law. In Leibovitch, the court considered claims by the estate of a victim
killed in Israel during a shooting committed by the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad.324 The court construed the estate's claim as one for intentional
infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") but noted that the plaintiffs had
failed to offer a legal basis for such a claim under either Israeli or Ameri-
can law.3 2 5 The court thus undertook an independent analysis of Israeli
law and concluded that it was unclear whether that nation's law recog-
nized the estate's IIED claim. 32 6 The court concluded that both parties,
by failing to prove Israeli law, could be said to have acquiesced to the law




321. Id. at *2.
322. Id. at *5.
323. Id.
324. Leibovitch, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1076.
325. Id. at 1084.
326. Id.
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of the forum, and further noted that interpreting the plaintiffs' IIED
claim under Illinois law was a better alternative to denying the plaintiffs'
claim because "the United States has a unique interest in having a domes-
tic law apply in cases involving terrorist attacks on United States
citizens." 3 2 7
3. Damages
Generally, a plaintiff must prove that the consequences of the foreign
state's conduct were reasonably certain, i.e., more likely than not to oc-
cur.3 2 8 A plaintiff must also prove the amount of the damages by a rea-
sonable estimate. 329 To determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to
damages under the FSIA, the courts apply general principles of tort
law. 33 0 When calculating damages, the courts also seek to ensure that
individuals with similar injuries receive similar awards. 3 31 In 2014, the
courts addressed various types of damages available under the terrorism
exception, including "economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering,
and punitive damages."3 3 2
a. Economic Damages
Courts have awarded damages under the terrorism exception for rea-
sonably foreseeable economic loss. "Under the FSIA, injured victims
and the estates of deceased victims may recover economic damages,
which typically include lost wages, benefits and retirement pay, and other
out-of-pocket expenses." 333 As in previous years, courts in 2014 contin-
ued to rely on the testimony of experts and the authority of special mas-
ters to determine damages. 334
b. Pain and Suffering
Under the FSIA terrorism exceptions, courts determine the amount to
award for pain and suffering based on a variety of factors, including the
severity of the pain immediately following the injury, the length of hospi-
talization, and the extent of the victim's impairment. 335 Those killed in-
327. Id. at 1084-85 (quoting Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90,
102 (D.D.C. 2006)).
328. See, e.g., Onsongo v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2014)
(citing Valore at 83).
329. See, e.g., id.
330. See, e.g., id. (citing Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F.Supp.2d 128, 157, n.3
(D.D.C. 2011)).
331. See, e.g., id. at 150 (quoting Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25,
54 (D.D.C. 2007)).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4).
333. See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 71 F. Supp. 3d 252, 258 (D.D.C. 2014).
334. Section 1605A specifically provides for the use of Special Masters to determine
damages in cases falling within the terrorism exception. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(e)(1).
335. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 149-50 (quoting O'Brien v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 853 F.Supp.2d 44, 46 (D.D.C.2012)).
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stantly are generally not compensated for pain and suffering. 336 Courts
historically have adhered to a basic framework for calculating damages,
with specific benchmarks for specific injuries, but with departures for ex-
traordinary circumstances.
For example, in Opati v. Republic of Sudan, the court agreed to an
upward departure for a victim of the U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania
and Kenya, where she was pulled from the rubble with injuries so severe
that rescuers thought she was dead, ultimately resulting in her loss of vi-
sion in one eye and diminished movement in one hand. 33 7 It also did so
with another victim who contracted HIV while rushing to help with the
recovery.33 8
Solatium damages compensate plaintiffs for "the mental anguish, be-
reavement and grief that those with a close personal relationship to a
decedent experience . . . . as well as the harm caused by the loss of the
decedent's society and comfort." 33 9 Accordingly, these damages are only
available to immediate family members, such as parents, siblings, spouses,
and children. 34 0 As with awards for pain and suffering, courts in 2014
similarly have tended to follow a consistent framework for damages, with
specific amounts for spouses, parents, children, and siblings, but with de-
partures from that framework based on the circumstances. 341
For instance, courts have differentiated between family members of
victims who were injured, rather than killed.3 4 2 Solatium awards to fam-
ily members of surviving victims also typically do not exceed the amount
awarded to the survivors for their pain and suffering.343 However, courts
have deviated from these baselines where, for example, a plaintiff has
established a particularly close relationship with the victim, or where evi-
dence suggests that the victim's pain and suffering was particularly acute
or agonizing. 344 For example, the court in Spencer v. Islamic Republic of
Iran implemented an upward departure for the parents of a serviceman
injured in the Beirut Marine barracks bombings, where they were initially
informed that their son had died in the attack. 345 In contrast, the court
approved a downward departure for parents of an injured serviceman,
336. See, e.g., Amduso v. Republic of Sudan, 61 F. Supp. 3d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2014);
Owens, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (citing Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 53).
337. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 78; see also Wamai v. Republic of
Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93-94 (D.D.C. 2014) (approving upward departure where
victims suffered more egregious wounds than suffered by others, such as lost eyes,
extreme burns, skull fractures, brain damage, ruptured lungs, or months of
recovery).
338. Id.
339. Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 71 F. Supp. 3d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting
Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 25 (D.D.C.2011)).
340. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 150-51 (citing Valore at 79)); Amduso, 61 F.
Supp. 3d at 49-50 (citing Valore at 79).
341. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 151; Amduso, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
342. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 151; Amduso, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
343. See, e.g., Amduso, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
344. See, e.g., Spencer, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 28 (quoting Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27).
345. Spencer at 29.
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where they had separated from their son when he was five years old. 3 4 6
The court completely denied solatium damages to the serviceman's fa-
ther, who had lost all ties with his son shortly after his birth.347
Unlike its predecessor section 1605(a)(7), section 1605A allows plain-
tiffs to seek punitive damages against state sponsors of terrorism.34 8 Pu-
nitive damage awards serve a deterrence function, and in this category of
damages, courts scrutinize less the award as to each individual plaintiff
and instead focus on a total award that will serve to deter and punish the
defendant state sponsor of terrorism.349
Despite the horrific nature of the events in section 1605A cases, courts
are usually thoughtful in awarding punitive damages and consider four
primary factors: (1) the character of foreign state's act; (2) the nature and
extent of the actual or intended harm to the plaintiffs; (3) the need for
deterrence; and (4) the wealth of the foreign state.35 0 For example, in
Onsongo v. Republic of Sudan, the court affirmed a special master's rec-
ommendation of punitive damages amounting to almost $100 million, or
the equivalent of the compensatory damages awarded. 351 The court did
so after considering the above four factors, finding the award appropriate
because the nature of the attack was "horrific," the number of murdered
and injured victims was extensive, the need for deterrence was "tremen-
dous," and-although evidence regarding Sudan and Iran's wealth was
scant-they were foreign states with presumably "substantial" assets.352
G. THE "TREATY EXCEPTION"-SECTION 1604
Section 1604 of the FSIA provides that both the FSIA's grant of immu-
nity and the exceptions to that immunity listed in section 1605 are "sub-
ject to existing international agreements to which the United States [was]
a party at the time" the FSIA was enacted. 353 The treaty exception can
be invoked either to expand or to limit a foreign sovereign's immunity,
but some courts have held that interpretation of the treaty exception to
limit immunity is disfavored. 354 Thus, a suit against a sovereign pursuant
to one of the FSIA's exceptions to immunity can proceed only if it does
not conflict with a pre-existing treaty to which the U.S. was a party.3 5 5
In 2014, the treaty exception was examined in some detail in Simon v.
346. Id. at 30; see also Wamai, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 95, n.8 (reducing solatium award where
children of deceased victim had been separated from father for extended period of
time).
347. Id. at 30-31.
348. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(e)(1).
349. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 87);
Amduso, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 51-52 (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 87).
350. See, e.g., Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (citing Valore at 87); Amduso, 61 F. Supp.
3d at 52 (quoting Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (D.D.C.2012)).
351. Onsongo, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 152-55.
352. Id. at 152-53.
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
354. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp 3d 381, 409 (D.D.C. 2014), rev'd in
part, 812 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
355. See id.
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Republic of Hungary.356 After outlining the contours of the treaty excep-
tion, the court agreed with the defendants that the treaty at issue pro-
vided "a process to administer the class of claims now raised by the
plaintiffs," which were claims stemming from the discriminatory expro-
priation of rights and property from Hungarian Jews during World War II
and the "exclusive mechanism and forum for the resolution of" such
claims.357 Thus, the court held that the treaty "expressly conflict[ed]"
with the FSIA and therefore precluded the district court's exercise of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 35 8 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court. 3 59 The D.C. Circuit held that the treaty was not the sole
means of recovery for the plaintiffs' claims, and therefore there was no
conflict between the FSIA.36 0 Accordingly, the treaty exception did not
apply, and defendant's immunity had to be analyzed by the normal FSIA
rules.361
V. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate that one of the exceptions to immu-
nity applies, convince a court to exercise jurisdiction, and obtain a judg-
ment against a sovereign defendant, enforcing that judgment presents
additional challenges with which the courts continued to grapple in 2014.
A. IMMUNITY FRom REMEDIES EQUIVALENT TO ATTACHMENT
Section 1609 provides that the property of a foreign sovereign in the
U.S. "shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution." 362 This
immunity includes remedies that are "the functional equivalent of attach-
ment, arrest, and execution," 363 such as restraining notices, turnover pro-
ceedings, injunctions against sovereign property, or requirements to post
prejudgment security that "would create precisely the same result that
would obtain if the foreign sovereign's assets were formally attached." 36 4
In Thai-Lao Lignite, the court considered whether a sovereign could be
required to post security as a condition for vacating an award against
it.365 The court had previously entered judgment against Laos enforcing
an arbitral award, but the arbitral award had since been vacated by the
356. Id. at 415, 419-420.
357. Id. at 424.
358. Id.
359. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127 (D.D.C. 2016).
360. Id. at 136-140.
361. Id.
362. 28 U.S.C. § 1609; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 52 (1st
Cir. 2013).
363. 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
364. Id. (citing Stephens v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1229 (2d Cir.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)), see also Pine Top Receivables of Illi-
nois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 771 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2014).
365. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of Lao People's Democratic Republic, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
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Malaysian courts.366 Laos thus asked the court to vacate its previous
judgment, and the court agreed.36 7 The plaintiffs had asked the court to
order Laos to post security, either as a condition for seeking vacatur, or in
the event the court granted vacatur.3 68 The court rejected this request,
holding that because the plaintiffs had not yet identified any assets in the
United States that were used for a commercial purpose, as required for
the exception to attachment immunity in section 1610(a) to apply, order-
ing Laos to post security would be the equivalent to an impermissible
attachment under section 1609.369
Similarly, in Pine Top Receivables of Illinois v. Banco de Seguros del
Estado, reinsurer Pine Top moved to strike the responsive pleading of the
defendant, an entity wholly owned by Uruguay, for failure to post pre-
answer security as required by state law governing out-of-state insur-
ers. 3 7 0 The defendant opposed the motion on the ground that the FSIA
bars any requirement of prejudgment security, and Pine Top acknowl-
edged that the defendant's status as an entity wholly owned by Uruguay
brings it within the purview of the FSIA. 371 The federal district court
initially denied reinsurer Pine Top's motion to strike, and Pine Top imme-
diately appealed. 372 Addressing this matter of first impression in the Sev-
enth Circuit, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the FSIA bars
any requirement of prejudgment security because such a requirement
would qualify as an "attachment" under the statute. 37 3
On the other hand, courts have refused to extend immunity to requests
for, e.g., injunctions to require a foreign state to comply with its existing
contractual obligations, 374 or post-judgment discovery about the location
of the country's assets in the United States. 37 5 For example, in Republic
of Argentina v. NML Capital, the Supreme Court upheld post-judgment
discovery orders on nonparty banks for information about a sovereign's
assets outside the U.S. 3 7 6 So long as the post-judgment discovery order
complies with the applicable federal or state law, the Court held there is
366. Id. at 215-16.
367. Id. at 216.
368. Id. at 228.
369. Id. at 228-29.
370. Pine Top Receivables of Illinois LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 771 F.3d 980
(7th Cir. 2014).
371. Id. at 981.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (U.S. Jun. 16, 2014) (No. 13-990) (FSIA did not prohibit
injunction requiring Argentina to pay holders of defaulted FAA bonds if it makes
payments to other bond holders because the injunction "d[id] not attach, arrest, or
execute upon any property." Rather, Argentina was free to pay the "FAA debts
with whatever resources it likes.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
375. Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, 573 U.S. -, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014); see Aurelius
Capital Master, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 589 Fed. Appx. 16 (2d Cir. 2014); see also
Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic,
924 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
376. Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2256-58.
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no FSIA immunity "limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-
sovereign judgment debtor's assets,"-even if some of those assets might
later prove to be immune from attachment.3 77
B. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
Section 1610(a) provides that a foreign state's property "shall not be
immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution" if the
property was used for commercial activity in the United States and the
property in question "was used for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based."37 8
In determining whether this exception to attachment immunity applies,
courts look at whether the actions the foreign state performed with re-
spect to the property were those in which "a private party engages in
trade and traffic or commerce." 379 Put another way, "if the activity is one
in which a private person could engage, [the foreign sovereign] is not en-
titled to immunity."s380
In Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, the Sec-
ond Circuit agreed with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the analysis
under 1610(a) must focus not on how the state made or obtained the
money, but on how it uses it.381 The plaintiffs in that case were seeking to
enforce a judgment against Grenada by attaching "funds that commercial
third parties (primarily airlines and cruise lines having some United
States-based operations) owe to several Grenadian statutory corpora-
tions." 382 The court held that the source of these funds was irrelevant;
the relevant question was "the use to which Grenada puts-or clearly
intends to put, by virtue of some formal designation or other specific
means-the funds at issue." 383 As most funds were used for "'carrying
out public functions in Grenada,' and '[] for the maintenance of facilities
and services in Grenada,"' not the United States, those funds "fail[ed]
both the 'commercial use' and the 'in the United States' prongs" of sec-
tion 1610(a). 38 4 As to certain other funds, which were forwarded to a
377. Id. at 2256.
378. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a). Section 1610(a) also provides for additional circumstances in
which property in the U.S. used for commercial activity in the U.S. will not be
immune from attachment or execution, e.g., if the foreign state has waived its im-
munity from attachment or execution, or if the execution relates to a judgment
establishing rights in property taken (or exchanged for property taken) in violation
of international law.
379. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., 2013 WL 1703873, at *6 (citing NML Capital Ltd. v.
Republic of Arg., 680 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2012)).
380. Id. (citing LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., No. 96 Civ. 6360 JFK., 2000 WL
745550, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000)).
381. Exp-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, 768 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240 (5th
Cir. 2002), Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.
2007)).
382. Id. at 78.
383. Id. at 90-91.
384. Id. at 91.
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trustee that serviced certain bonds issued by Grenada, the court con-
cluded it needed more information about the bonds before it could deter-
mine whether the funds were used for commercial activity, and so
remanded the issue for further fact-finding. 385
In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the plaintiffs attempted to attach
certain Iranian artifacts in the possession of museums in the U.S. to sat-
isfy a judgment against Iran. 3 8 6 The court rejected the plaintiffs' efforts,
holding that the state itself had to engage in the commercial activity.3 87
Although section 1610 does not explicitly require that the commercial
activity be carried out by the state, the court held that the context of the
FSIA "demonstrates that it is the sovereign's commercial activities that
subject the property to attachment." 3 88 Additionally, the court held that
the museums were not agents of Iran whose activity could be attributed
to the state; a bailment agreement with the state did not transform the
museums into agents, because Iran had no control over their activities
and because the museums were acting for their own benefit, not for the
benefit of Iran.3 8 9
C. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 1610(c)
"Before permitting enforcement of an FSIA judgment, a court must
ensure that all foreign entities involved receive notice of the exposure of
their property and other interests to attachment and execution." 390 Thus,
section 1610(c) provides that "[n]o attachment or execution [under Sec-
tion 1610(a) or (b)] shall be permitted until the court has ordered such
attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable pe-
riod of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of
any notice required under section 1608(e) [for a default judgment]."3 9 1
In 2014, the main issue courts faced regarding section 1610(c) was the
relationship between that section and section 1610(g), which governs at-
tachment in aid of execution of terrorism judgments; those cases are dis-
cussed in the following section.
D. TERRORISM JUDGMENTS - ATrACHMENT AND EXECUTION
The FSIA contains separate rules for attachment and execution in
cases involving victims of state-sponsored terrorism.
1. Section 1610(g)
Section 1610(g) authorizes "attachment in aid of an execution of a
385. Id.
386. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
387. Id. at 1009.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1011.
390. Cortez Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Indus. de Olancho, S.A, 974 F. Supp. 2d
264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 798 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 267 (D.D.C. 2011)).
391. Id. at 266-67.
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judgment entered under section 1605A." 392 It provides that "property of
a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A,
and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state . . . is
subject to attachment in aid of execution." 393 Section 1610(g) not only
allows attachment of property of a foreign state, but also property of an
agency or instrumentality "that is a separate juridical entity or is an inter-
est held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity." 394
Despite its potentially broad application, courts in 2014 found little op-
portunity to address attachments under section 1610(g). Courts that did
address 1610(g) attachment focused on the interplay between section
1610(g) and other sections of the FSIA. For example, in Gates v. Syrian
Arab Republic, the court found that, by its text, section 1610(c) applied
only to attachments based on the commercial activity exception under
subsections 1610(a) and (b), and not to attachments to satisfy terrorism
judgments under section 1610(g). 3 95 In Gates, two competing groups of
plaintiffs both sought to attach Syrian assets in satisfaction of a terrorism
judgment. 396 One group of plaintiffs obtained an order from the District
Court for the District of Columbia that, pursuant to section 1610(c), a
reasonable amount of time had passed since the terrorism judgment. 397
The plaintiffs then registered the terrorism judgment in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, accompanied by the section 1610(c) judgment, and began
seeking to attach various assets.398 The second group of plaintiffs then
intervened, arguing that the first plaintiffs' failure to obtain a new section
1610(c) order from the Illinois court should prevent those plaintiffs from
recovering the sought-after assets, leaving them available for the second
plaintiffs to attach.399 The Illinois court held that no new section 1610(c)
order was required. 400 First, the Court reasoned that section 1610(c) did
not apply to section 1610(g), and that, when Congress enacted section
1610(g), Congress had explicitly declined to subject attachment under the
new section to the requirements of section 1610(c). 401 Second, the court
reasoned that even if section 1610(c) did apply, only one section 1610(c)
order was necessary to allow the plaintiffs to pursue assets in any jurisdic-
tion.402 Thus, the first plaintiffs were not prevented from pursuing their
392. Calderon-Cardona v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 770 F.3d 993, 1000 (2d Cir.
2014).
393. 28 U.S.C. 1610(g)(1).
394. Calderon-Cardona, 770 F.3d at 999 (quoting FSIA § 1610(g)(1)).
395. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
396. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 570.
399. Id. at 574.
400. Id. at 575.
401. Id. at 575-76; but see Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015)
(disagreeing with the Gates court, holding that "[a] close reading of § 1610 con-
vinces this Court that, notwithstanding the plaintiff-friendly aims of [1610(g)] . . .
§ 1610(c) still applies to plaintiffs . . . seeking to enforce a judgment under
§ 1605A").
402. Id. at 577-78.
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section 1610(g) attachment for failure to obtain a second determination
that a reasonable period of time had elapsed under section 1610(c). 4 0 3
2. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
A related statutory scheme permits victims of state-sponsored terror-
ism to execute on judgments against foreign sovereigns that sponsor ter-
rorism. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"), codified in
part as section 1610 note, allows plaintiffs to execute on a judgment
against blocked assets of a terrorist party, as well as the assets of any
agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party. 404 TRIA defines a ter-
rorist party as "a terrorist, a terrorist organization . . . or a foreign state
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979.1"405
One issue that courts considered in 2014 is what constitutes "blocked
assets" that terrorism victims may attach to secure a judgment against a
terrorist entity. For example, in Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, the court clarified that, while many "blocked assets" under
TRIA are blocked pursuant to the authority of the Treasury Depart-
ment's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), not all assets blocked
by OFAC qualify as "blocked assets" under TRIA. 4 0 6
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, the U.S. government had previously blocked
defendant banks' assets through its sanctions policy. 4 0 7 But the banks
argued that, because the government had not prohibited them from "ex-
ercising the power and privileges normally associated with ownership,"
there had been no "transfer" of their possessory interest, meaning the
sanctions could not create "blocked assets" under TRIA.4 08 The court
disagreed, holding that because the properties were managed by a court-
appointed monitor who controlled all expenditures, which were strictly
limited, and managed all related funds, the defendant banks had indeed
lost the ability to exercise the powers and privileges normally associated
with ownership. 4 09 The banks' assets were thus "blocked" under
TRIA.4 10 In 2016, the Second Circuit vacated this holding, identifying
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the assets could be con-
sidered "blocked assets" under the TRIA and therefore remanding to the
403. Id.
404. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002);
see In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, No. 08 Civ. 10934(KBF), 2014 WL
1284494, at *14 (quoting TRIA § 201(a)); see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010-11 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding that Iranian artifacts
housed in U.S. museum for research purposes were not subject to attachment
under TRIA because Iran and museum had created merely a bailment relationship
and not one of agency).
405. In re 650 Fifth Ave., 2014 WL 1516328, at *14 (quoting TRIA § 201(d)(4)).
406. Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713, 723 (11th Cir.
2014).
407. In re 650 Fifth Ave., 2014 WL 1516328, at *14.
408. Id. at *15.
409. Id.
410. Id.
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district court for further proceedings.4 11
Some courts also analyzed whether electronic fund transfers ("EFTs")
could be considered blocked assets subject to TRIA. For example, in Pe-
terson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, family members of servicemen killed in
the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut attempted to satisfy a de-
fault judgment against Iran by serving several financial institutions with
writs of attachment obtained under TRIA.4 12 When one of the defendant
banks represented that it did not hold any Iranian property, the plaintiffs
moved for sanctions, believing that the bank should have disclosed cer-
tain blocked EFTs, which the plaintiffs argued were subject to TRIA. 4 1 3
The EFTs had been destined for accounts in Iranian banks, but because
the transfers had been blocked, the funds were still held in a special, fro-
zen account in the United States. 4 1 4 The court denied the plaintiffs' mo-
tion.4 15 The court reasoned that legal title could not pass to the Iranian
banks until those banks accepted the payments.4 16 Because the payments
had been blocked, the banks had never held legal title, and thus Iran, as
owner of the Iranian banks, never had a property interest in the contested
funds. 4 17
Similarly, in Hausler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, the court looked to
the law of the state in which the at-issue EFTs were blocked to determine
whether Cuba had a property interest in them.4 18 Under New York law,
when an EFT is blocked by an intermediary bank, only the party who
passed the EFT on to that bank has a property interest in it.419 Because it
was undisputed that Cuba had not initiated the blocked EFTs, the EFTs
were not "blocked assets" under TRIA. 4 2 0
Another unique issue to face 2014 courts was the extent to which the
court adjudicating attachment proceedings should defer to the initial
judgment rendered by a different court. In Vera v. Republic of Cuba,
family members of those tortured and killed by the Cuban government
had a judgment against Cuba awarded by a Florida state court under the
FSIA.4 2 1 But when the plaintiffs brought turnover proceedings under the
TRIA in a New York district court, the affected bank argued that the
judgment was void because the Florida state court did not have subject-
411. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, 830 F.3d at 117.
412. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 561 Fed. Appx. 9, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 2015 WL 132998 (U.S. 2015).
413. Id. at 10.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 10 (citing Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.3d 934 (D.C.Cir.2013)). In
both Peterson and Heiser, Iran was not the owner of the account for which the
funds were destined, only the owner of the banks where those accounts were held.
417. Id.
418. Hausler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 770 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2014).
419. Id. (quoting Calderon-Cardona v. JPMorgan Case Bank, N.A., 770 F.3d 993, 1002
(2d Cir. 2014)).
420. Id.
421. Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 40 F. Supp. 3d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' original claims. 422 The New York
court rejected the bank's argument. 4 2 3 The Florida court's judgment was
entitled to deference under the Constitution's Full Faith & Credit Clause,
where the state court had fully and fairly litigated the issues before it,
including jurisdiction, and had not violated either party's due process
rights in issuing its judgment. 4 2 4
VI. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION
In 2014, judicial decisions regarding the FSIA explored various proce-
dural issues that arise in cases brought against foreign sovereigns, such as
service of process, due process and personal jurisdiction, jurisdictional
discovery, and default judgments. 4 2 5 A brief review of certain notable
decisions follows.
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process pursuant to the FSIA must comport with sections
1608(a) and (b), which set forth the acceptable methods of service on
foreign states or their political subdivisions, and their agencies or instru-
mentalities.4 2 6 Each provision provides a hierarchy of methods to effect
service, such that a plaintiff may resort to subsequent methods of service
only if it is unable to effect service under the prior methods. 4 2 7
While strict compliance with section 1608(a) is required in an action
against a foreign state or political subdivision, 4 2 8 only substantial compli-
ance with the service rules is required under section 1608(b) in actions
against an agency or instrumentality of the state.4 2 9 Thus, for example,
some courts have allowed cases to proceed against an agency or instru-
mentality based on "'technically faulty service' [under section 1608(b)] as
long as the defendants receive adequate notice of the suit and are not
prejudiced." 430
In Doe v. Holy See, the plaintiff brought suit against a Catholic priest
and the Holy See, among others, to recover damages suffered as a result
of alleged sexual abuse.431 The plaintiff attempted to serve the original
complaint on the Holy See through both the clerk of court and the State
422. Id. at 369-70.
423. Id. at 370.
424. Id. at 376-77.
425. Other practical issues may also arise; some, relating to venue, forum non con-
veniens, the act of state doctrine, and interlocutory appeal, have been discussed in
this Review in previous years. This edition of the Review focuses on only those
issues which were addressed by the courts 2014.
426. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a), (b).
427. See Cortez Byrd, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (internal citations omitted); see also
Kaplan, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
428. See Jimenez v. United Mexican States, 978 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
429. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing Doe I v. State
of Isr. 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102 (D.D.C. 2005)).
430. Id. (citation omitted).
431. Doe v. Holy See, No. 13-128, 2014 WL 1329985(E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2014).
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Department, but subsequently filed an amended complaint without at-
tempting service of that complaint upon the Holy See. 4 3 2 The Holy See
moved to dismiss the claims against it for insufficient service of process,
insufficient process, and lack of personal jurisdiction under section
1608(a).
Emphasizing that only strict adherence to the notice requirements of
section 1608(a) renders service effective, the court found that the plaintiff
had failed to properly effect notice upon the Holy See because he failed
to serve the amended complaint, did not serve a translation thereof, and
failed to provide a notice of suit that accurately described the lawsuit. 4 3 3
While the plaintiff did not dispute this failure to serve the amended com-
plaint, he contended that he "honestly believe[d] that service on Defen-
dant [. . .] was completed in strict compliance" with the FSIA's
requirements. 4 3 4 The court rejected this argument, finding that the plain-
tiff's "honest belief" was "irrelevant" because it fell short of the explicit
standard under section 1608(a). 435 Accordingly, the court granted the
Holy See's motion to dismiss for insufficient service, without prejudice,
granting the plaintiff's request for a second attempt to properly effect
service on the Holy See. 4 3 6
In McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Board of the Republic of the
Philippines, a pre-adoptive parent brought suit against the adoption
agency, as an agency or instrumentality of the Philippines, seeking to en-
join the adoption agency from removing a minor child from the pre-adop-
tive parent's home.4 3 7 The defendant removed the case to federal court
beyond the deadline for removal, and the plaintiff moved to remand to
the probate court. 438 In contesting the remand, the defendant contended
that the 30-day period for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) was
never triggered because service of process had been improper.439 The
defendant further contended that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) permits extensions
of the period for removal "for cause shown" and that the insufficient ser-
vice constituted good cause.44 0 The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ments and found that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the
FSIA's service requirements under section 1608(b) and had provided ac-
tual notice of the lawsuit to the defendants where, in response to techni-
cally deficient service, the defendant adoption agency or its
representative had filed a request to enter an appearance pro se, re-
quested telephonic access to a probate court hearing, filed an appearance
in a related guardianship matter, and actively participated in the
432. Id. at *2, *3.
433. Id. at *6.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at *7.
437. McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Bd. of the Republic of the Phil., 62
F.Supp.3d 187 (D. Mass. 2014).
438. Id. at 191.
439. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
440. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
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matter.441
B. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Historically, courts that have addressed the issue have held that, for
purposes of the FSIA, foreign states are not "persons" protected by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 442 Accordingly, foreign
states typically may not assert a lack of due process as a defense in FSIA
litigation. The consequence for a foreign state is that it is "not subject to
the minimum contacts analysis prior to the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion." 4 4 3 Thus, once subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA has been
established and defendants are properly served pursuant to the require-
ments of section 1608, the court will exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 4 4 4
But the inapplicability of due process protection to foreign states under
the FSIA does not necessarily extend to foreign agencies or instrumental-
ities. 4 4 5 A public foreign entity-e.g., a corporation owned and operated
by a foreign government-may be entitled to the same due process pro-
tections as a private foreign entity that is subject to jurisdiction in U.S.
courts, provided that it is run separately and independently from the sov-
ereign. 446 However, due process protections may not apply even to such
entities where, e.g., the entity "is so extensively controlled by its owner
that a relationship of principal and agent is created," or where honoring
the distinction between instrumentality and sovereign "would work fraud
or injustice." 447
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue, the court concluded that the defendants were
"alter egos" of Iran, with "no true separate decision-making authority or
real existence" apart from the state, and therefore granted the plaintiff's
motions for summary judgment, authorizing the turnover of assets of a
foreign sovereign entity.44 8 A contrary result might have obtained in Wil-
liams v. Romarm SA, where the defendant was a state-owned firearms
manufacturer that the district court had found "'consistently' represented
itself as a separate entity from the Romanian State." 4 4 9 The plaintiffs
appealed from the district court's dismissal of their wrongful death action
441. McEachern, 62 F.Supp.3d at 191.
442. Capital Trans Int'l, 2013 WL 557236, at *5; GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680
F.3d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, 893 F. Supp.
2d 747, 752 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2012) ("Every circuit court to address the issue has held
'that foreign states are not "persons" protected by the Fifth Amendment
. .'")(citation omitted).
443. Cont'l Cas. Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 752 n.12 (citation omitted).
444. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b); see also Blue Ridge Invs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 902 F.
Supp. 2d 367, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
445. See Capital Trans Int'l, LLC, 2013 WL 557236, at *5.
446. GSS Grp. Ltd, 680 F.3d at 816.
447. Id. at 814 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
448. In re 650 Fifth Ave., No. 08 Civ. 10934 (KBF), 2014 WL 1516328, *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 18, 2014), rev'd sub nom. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Proper-
ties, 830 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2016).
449. Williams v. Romarm SA, 756 F.3d 777, 782 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 4 5 0 But on appeal, the
court refused to consider the issue of whether the government of
Romania controlled the defendant firearms manufacturer, and thus
whether the defendant was not a "person" entitled to due process protec-
tion. Because the appellants had never raised this issue in their brief, the
court found that appellants had forfeited the argument, "however
weighty [it] may be[.]" 45 1 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's case under the assumption that the de-
fendant firearms manufacturer was a "person" apart from the state, and
entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment. 4 52
C. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
Plaintiffs seeking relief from foreign sovereign defendants often seek
jurisdictional discovery where further fact-finding may be necessary to
establish that the foreign entity falls within one of the exceptions to sov-
ereign immunity. Because "the FSIA's immunity provisions aim to pro-
tect foreign sovereigns from the burdens of litigation, including the cost
and aggravation of discovery[,]" courts often are disinclined to require
foreign sovereigns to participate in discovery.453 Accordingly, jurisdic-
tional discovery typically is permitted only when the plaintiff is able to
carry its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that one or more
exceptions to immunity applies. 4 54
In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the FSIA limits the scope of discovery available to a
judgment creditor in a post-judgment execution proceeding against a for-
eign sovereign. 455 At previous stages of the case, Argentina had waived
its sovereign immunity; was found to owe money under valid judgments;
subsequently failed to pay, and apparently had no executable assets in the
United States. 4 5 6 Judgment creditor NML Capital sought discovery of
Argentina's property through subpoenas served upon two nonparty
banks. 4 5 7 The district court granted NML's motions to compel compli-
ance with these subpoenas, and the Second Circuit affirmed.4 5 8 On certi-
orari to the Supreme Court, Argentina argued that because the FSIA is
silent on the matter, discovery of assets that do not fall within an excep-
tion to execution immunity under section 1609 is forbidden. 459 Addition-
ally, both Argentina and the U.S. Government (as amicus curiae) urged
the court to consider the sovereignty and international comity implica-
450. Id. at 781.
451. Id. at 782.
452. Id. at 783.
453. Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 779
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
454. Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
455. Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 2250 (2014).
456. Id. at 2258.
457. Id. at 2253-54.
458. Id. at 2254.
459. Id. at 2257.
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tions of a decision to affirm the orders to compel compliance with NML's
subpoenas.4 60
The Supreme Court concluded that, assuming the district court had dis-
cretion to order discovery from third-party banks about a judgment
debtor's assets located outside the United States, the FSIA did not pre-
clude discovery of Argentina's extraterritorial assets. 461 The court re-
jected Argentina's argument that execution immunity under section 1609
implies coextensive discovery-in-aid-of-execution immunity, because sec-
tion 1609 by its terms immunizes only foreign-state property "in the
United States." 462 The court observed that the reason for NML's subpoe-
nas was that NML did not yet know what property Argentina had and
where it was located, "let alone whether it is executable under the rele-
vant jurisdiction's law." 4 6 3 Moreover, the court found that the prospect
that NML's general request for information about Argentina's worldwide
assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as
immune did not mean that NML could not pursue discovery of it.464 As
to the foreign policy implications of its decision, the court noted that
those concerns should be directed to the Executive Branch. 465 Although
the court acknowledged a secondary issue of whether foreign sovereign
immunity under the FSIA includes protection from being drawn into dis-
covery targeting third parties, it declined to address that question.466
In Aurelius Capital Master Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Argentina ap-
pealed from an order granting post-judgment discovery both from Argen-
tina and from certain third-party banks. 467 Argentina contended that the
FSIA prohibits discovery of sovereign property that is potentially im-
mune from attachment. 468 On appeal, the court held that appellees' dis-
covery demands did not run afoul of the FSIA, because insofar as the
discovery demands reached diplomatic or consular property that is im-
mune from attachment, Argentina should object if and when appellees
actually seek to execute on such property. 469
The court reasoned that the potential immunity of property from at-
tachment does not preclude discovery relating to that property, because
discovery may be necessary for the parties to properly litigate the exis-
tence of immunity. 470 Further, the court found that it was "entirely spec-
ulative" whether documents Argentina might regard as privileged or
inviolable would be responsive to appellees' discovery requests and, if so,
whether appellees would persist in demanding such documents in the face
460. Id. at 2258.




465. Id. at 2258.
466. Id.
467. Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 589 Fed.Appx. 16 (2014).
468. Id. at *17.
469. Id.
470. Id. at *18.
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of particularized claims of privilege by Argentina.4 7 1 Even as it affirmed
the district court's order, the court stressed the considerations of grace
and comity owed in matters touching upon a foreign sovereign's diplo-
matic and military affairs, and "urg[ed] the district court to closely con-
sider Argentina's sovereign interests in managing discovery, and to
prioritize discovery of those documents that are unlikely to prove inva-
sive of sovereign dignity," for example by "modify[ing] usual procedures
to accommodate [the eventual need for the court to review diplomatic
documents] in a way that is effective and respectful." 4 7 2
In De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, heirs of a Jewish Hungarian art
collector brought suit against the Republic of Hungary and various state
institutions, alleging that the defendants breached bailment agreements
entered into after World War II when they refused to return pieces of the
art collection upon the heirs' demand. 4 7 3 The court initially found that it
had subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the
FSIA. The D.C. Circuit then affirmed in part and reversed in part, hold-
ing that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to the commercial ac-
tivity exception and that the district court's dismissal, on other grounds,
of several of the plaintiffs' claims was premature. 4 74 On remand, the dis-
trict court ordered discovery to proceed and, based upon documentary
evidence produced, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 4 7 5 The court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The court noted that the documentary evidence al-
ready produced provided some support for the plaintiffs' jurisdictional
assertions, and because "the Court believe[d] that further discovery
'could produce [facts] that would affect [its] jurisdictional analysis,"' the
court held that it would be premature to rule on the merits of the defend-
ants' motion until fact discovery had concluded.476
D. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
When a foreign sovereign does not answer or otherwise defend itself
against a complaint, a court may grant a default judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.4 7 7 Before a court enters a default judgment on a claim under
the FSIA, the plaintiff must establish that there is sufficient evidence to
support its right to relief, as section 1608(e) requires that default can only
471. Id. at *17-*18.
472. Id. at *18.
473. De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 75 F. Supp. 3d 380 (D.D.C. 2014).
474. Id. at 381-82.
475. Id. at 382.
476. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1147
(D.C.Cir.1994). Following the completion of all fact discovery, the defendants
once again moved for dismissal. In March 2016, the district court held that it had
jurisdiction under the expropriation exception but that "plaintiffs [could not] show
a factual basis for their claim of jurisdiction under the [FSIA]'s commercial activity
exception." Civil Action No. 10-1261 (ESH), 2016 WL 1048758 (D.D.C. March 14,
2016).
477. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
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be entered on "evidence satisfactory to the court." 478 The court may ac-
cept all uncontroverted evidence as true, which may be in the form of
sworn affidavits or transcripts. 479 The evidence proffered, however, is
subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence.480 A court may also take judi-
cial notice of findings and conclusions in related proceedings. 4 8 1
In Han Kim, the brother and son of an abducted South Korean na-
tional, sued officials, employees, and agents of North Korea under the
terrorism exception to the FSIA, seeking damages resulting from the ab-
duction. 4 82 The plaintiffs alleged that the abductee, a religious official,
was sent to a state penal colony, tortured, and killed.4 8 3 North Korea
failed to appear in the action, and the family members moved for an en-
try of default judgment. The court denied this request, finding that the
plaintiffs' complaint had not provided sufficient evidence to invoke the
FSIA's torture exception, thus depriving the court of subject matter juris-
diction over the case. 4 8 4 The district court determined that the plaintiffs'
witnesses could not establish that the religious official's treatment
"amount[ed] to torture under the rigorous definition of that term
adopted in the FSIA," but instead engaged only in a discussion about the
abuses generally perpetrated in North Korean labor camps. The plaintiffs
appealed. 4 8 5
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of how much and what kind of
evidence the FSIA's default provision requires, ultimately reversing and
remanding with instructions to enter a default judgment against North
Korea. 48 6 The court considered uncontroverted evidence of the official's
activities and subsequent abduction by North Korean operatives, along
with the testimony of experts on conditions within North Korean labor
camps, and found that the admissible record evidence demonstrated that
North Korea abducted the official, that it "invariably tortures and kills
political prisoners," and that "through terror and intimidation it prevents
any information about those crimes from escaping to the outside
world." 4 8 7 Given these state-imposed restrictions on the free flow of in-
formation from the country,. especially in cases of forced disappearance,
478. Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 126; Spencer, 922 F. Supp.
2d at 109; Cortez Byrd, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)).
479. Firebird Global Master Fund II, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (citing Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2012)).
480. Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 950 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C.
2013).
481. Goldberg-Botvin, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1 (finding that evidence presented in plain-
tiffs' previous case, and in another case arising from same bombing, established
that Iran was culpable for both the extrajudicial killing of plaintiffs' family member
and the provision of material support to the terrorist organization involved in the
bombing).
482. Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044 (D. C. Cir.
2014).
483. Id. at 1045.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1046.
486. Id. at 1047, 1045.
487. Id. at 1045.
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the court reasoned that "[r]equiring a plaintiff to produce direct, first-
hand evidence of the victim's torture and murder would [ ] thwart the
purpose of the terrorism exception: holding state sponsors of terrorism
accountable for torture and extrajudicial killing." 488 In view of Con-
gress's purpose in enacting the terrorism exception, and the court's au-
thority, if not "obligation," to adjust evidentiary requirements to differing
situations, the court found the plaintiffs' evidence sufficient to establish
subject matter jurisdiction and to satisfy section 1608(e)'s standard for
default judgment against North Korea.4 8 9
In Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the plaintiffs brought an action
against Iran under the terrorism exception to the FSIA for injuries arising
out of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon
nearly three decades earlier, in October 1983.490 When Iran failed to ap-
pear, the plaintiffs moved for default judgment on the issue of liability.4 9 1
In evaluating plaintiffs' motion, the district court was confronted with the
novel question of whether section 1605A's statute of limitations is a juris-
dictional requirement, such that the court must raise and consider it sua
sponte despite a defendant's failure to raise it by failing to appear.4 9 2
Looking to the text of the provision, the court noted that it was plausi-
ble to conclude that jurisdiction under the FSIA requires a claim to be
brought in compliance with all aspects of sections 1605 to 1607, including
the limitations provision of section 1605A. 4 9 3 However, the court ulti-
mately held that interpreting the FSIA's text to indicate a jurisdictional
limitations period would not comport with the Supreme Court's "bright
line" rule that a statute "clearly state" that a particular provision is juris-
dictional. 4 9 4 The court went on to find that neither the structure of the
FSIA nor prior judicial precedent establish that the limitations period is
jurisdictional.495 Further, the court declined to exercise its discretionary
authority to raise the limitations defense on Iran's behalf because statutes
of limitations are generally treated as affirmative defenses that may be
waived-by failing to appear, Iran waived what might have been a meri-
torious defense. 496
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